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Abstract 
This study provides comprehensive evidence on the return response of financially constrained 
firms listed on London Stock Exchange (LSE) to UK monetary policy shocks extracted from 
the Bank of England's MPC meetings relative to expectations embedded in interest rate 
futures prices, during the period June 1999- December 2011. Using a large number of 
financial constraints proxies, we find no significant evidence that the most constrained firms' 
returns are more responsive to monetary policy shocks relative to the least constrained ones, 
as the credit channel of the monetary policy transmission mechanism would suggest. We also 
show that the inverse relationship between interest rate shocks and UK stock returns reversed 
its sign and became significantly positive during the recent financial crisis period. Our results 
show that the Bank of England can affect stock market valuations by modifying interest rates, 
but this impact is much stronger during periods of tight credit market conditions. Hence, apart 
from the credit conditions in the wider economy, central banks should also monitor the 
response of capital and money markets’ participants to their policy decisions.  
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1. Introduction 
 The recent global crisis period has demonstrated that financial constraints play a 
crucial role on all aspects of corporate decisions. Financial constraints are essentially frictions 
that may prevent firms from funding all desired investments and pose to them restrictions to 
grow because they affect their financing and investment decisions. The severity of these 
financial constraints and their impact on corporate policies crucially depend on the 
macroeconomic environment, and, in particular, on the monetary policy stance by the central 
bank. The interest rate and credit channels of the monetary policy transmission mechanism 
imply that in the advent of a tightening monetary policy stance, the most financially 
constrained firms are expected to experience more severe problems because they are typically 
characterized by lower interest coverage ratios, lower borrowing capacity, worse credit 
ratings, lower cash holdings, higher leverage and higher agency costs of debt in comparison 
to the least constrained firms. Therefore, monetary policy shocks constitute a potential source 
of risk that may affect differentially the most and the least financially constrained firms.  
 This potentially differential impact on corporate decisions may also affect differently 
the cost of capital, and hence the stock prices of the constrained firms relative to the 
unconstrained ones. As a result, monetary policy shocks may have different asset pricing 
implications across firms that face different degrees of financial constraints. In this study, we 
directly test this hypothesis for a large cross-section of UK firms, using a plethora of proxies 
for financial constraints and a number of alternative proxies for monetary policy shocks. 
 Given the importance of monetary policy shocks, the financial press and professional 
investors closely follow monetary policy decisions as well as the statements of central banks’ 
board members in their attempt to extract information with respect to current and future 
movements in asset prices. The importance of this issue has spurred a growing literature of 
studies examining the impact of monetary policy decisions on stock market returns (see, inter 
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alia, the seminal studies of Jensen and Johnson, 1995, Thorbecke, 1997, and Bernanke and 
Kuttner, 2005). The versatility of the literature is reflected in the different methodological 
approaches and the asset menus that researchers have employed (see Jensen et al., 1997, 
Sellin, 2001, Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2004, Bredin et al., 2009, Bredin et al., 2010, and 
Kontonikas and Kostakis, 2013).  
 The most obvious way through which monetary policy decisions affect stock price 
valuations is through the economy-wide interest rate channel. Smirlock and Yawitz (1985), 
using a standard dividend discount model, argue that an increase in the interest rate raises the 
discount rate applied to firm’s future cash flows, i.e. the opportunity cost of capital, and 
hence it considerably reduces its cash flows’ present value. Moreover, as Bernanke and 
Gertler (1995) argue, an increase in the policy rate can hamper real economic activity 
because it reduces current consumer demand and expenditure by increasing the cost of 
borrowing for consumption and investment. As a result, firms’ current net cash flows and 
expectations over future ones are diminished, leading again to lower stock prices. Another 
very important channel through which changes in interest rates can affect stock prices is the 
credit channel of the monetary policy transmission process, as described by Bernanke and 
Blinder (1992), which affects the “external finance premium”, i.e. the wedge between the 
cost of funds generated internally and the cost of externally raised funds. In particular, this 
channel consists of two mechanisms: the bank lending channel and the balance sheet channel 
(see Bernanke and Gertler, 1989 and Bernanke and Gertler, 1995 for a detailed analysis). 
 According to the balance sheet channel, a monetary tightening can reduce the 
company’s revenues due to lower consumer spending and increase its floating-rate interest 
payments, leading to a significant reduction in its net cash flows. Moreover, it can reduce the 
value of its assets and hence the value of the collaterals posted for its loans. This process 
deteriorates the company’s interest coverage ratio and other indicators of its financial health, 
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pulling the trigger of financial accelerator that amplifies the initial negative shock and 
magnifies the external finance premium due to an increase in the agency cost of debt. The 
bank lending channel has a more immediate effect. In a restrictive monetary environment, the 
total supply of intermediated credit is significantly reduced. Therefore, companies face more 
onerous credit terms or even a dramatic reduction in the level of funds they can borrow either 
from credit markets or from financial intermediaries and they are hindered from pursuing 
profitable investment opportunities. Consequently, net cash flows get considerably reduced 
and profitable projects are abandoned due to lack of funding. 
 Even though the previously described mechanisms may affect all of the firms in the 
economy, it is particularly interesting to examine whether and how the magnitude of these 
effects differs across firms with different capital structure and cash flow characteristics. In 
particular, the aim of this study is primarily to examine, for the first time in the literature, the 
impact of monetary policy shocks, as extracted from interest rate futures prices on Bank of 
England’s (BoE) Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) meeting days, across firms listed on 
London Stock Exchange (LSE) facing different degrees of “financial constraints”, i.e. 
frictions that prevent firms from funding all desired investments (Lamont et al., 2001) and 
pose to them restrictions to grow at their desirable pace (Whited and Wu, 2006). 
 The interest rate and credit channels of the monetary policy transmission mechanism 
imply that financially constrained firms are expected to experience more severe problems due 
to monetary tightening because they are typically characterized by lower interest coverage 
ratios, lower borrowing capacity, worse credit ratings, lower cash holdings, higher leverage, 
higher agency costs of debt and they are less able to raise capital due to their limited 
ownership base in comparison to the least constrained firms. Fazzari et al. (1988), Kashyap et 
al. (1994) and Hubbard (1998) have extensively analyzed the impact of financial constraints 
on firms’ financing, investment decisions and net cash flows. Guariglia and Mateut (2006) 
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and Guariglia (2008) provide similar evidence for UK firms. There are few studies in prior 
literature that have examined the impact of monetary policy on stock returns taking into 
account the effect of financial constraints. For example, Gertler and Gilchrist (1994), 
Thorbecke (1997), Perez-Quiros and Timmermann (2000) and Guo (2004), inter alia, 
differentiate between small and big capitalization stocks, arguing that a monetary tightening 
should affect more severely small companies because these are typically less well immunized 
against such an adverse economic condition and they face severe financing constraints. 
Nevertheless, firm capitalization is only a very rough proxy of these constraints.  
 To overcome this limitation, some recent studies have suggested a number of more 
appropriate proxies for firms’ financial constraints, examining their relationship with risk-
adjusted returns (see Hahn and Lee, 2009, for a review of the literature). As a by-product of 
their analysis, some of these studies have tested whether the differential return between the 
most and the least constrained firms is related to monetary conditions among other 
macroeconomic factors. In particular, Lamont et al. (2001), using size and the composite 
Kaplan-Zingales (KZ) index as measures, did not find a significant relationship between the 
spread return of the most minus the least constrained firms and the change in the Fed Funds 
rate or the growth in real M2. Similar is the evidence provided by Hahn and Lee (2009), who 
used asset tangibility as a measure of constraints and growth in real M2 as a proxy of 
monetary conditions. However, such tests are likely to suffer from endogeneity bias because 
changes in monetary variables measured at monthly or quarterly frequencies are unlikely to 
be purely exogenous. As Rigobon and Sack (2003, 2004) have convincingly shown, 
monetary policy decisions may have already incorporated stock market movements, and 
hence causality may run in both directions. 
 As a solution to the endogeneity problem, recent studies use the event study approach 
introduced by Kuttner (2001), relying on daily data to extract the unexpected component of 
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monetary policy decisions. Following this approach, Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2004), 
Basistha and Kurov (2008) and Jansen and Tsai (2010) have examined the differential impact 
of US monetary policy shocks on constrained versus unconstrained firms using a number of 
proxies to classify firms. In particular, Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2004) use cash flows, credit 
ratings, leverage ratios and Tobin’s q as proxies for financial constraints. However, they use 
only S&P 500 companies, which are probably the least constrained firms in the US market 
and they rely on survey expectations to extract monetary policy shocks. To the contrary, 
Basistha and Kurov (2008), who also examine only S&P 500 firms and use credit ratings, 
trade credit, size and payout ratios as constraints proxies, as well as Jansen and Tsai (2010), 
who use profitability, payout ratios and debt ratings as proxies, extract unanticipated changes 
in the Fed Funds rate relative to futures-implied expectations; this is the common practice in 
the literature since the seminal study of Bernanke and Kuttner (2005). Overall, these US 
studies find that the most constrained firms are more affected by monetary policy shocks 
relative to the least constrained ones and that the magnitude of this relationship exhibits state 
dependence. 
 Our study contributes to the literature by examining, for the first time, the return 
response of portfolios constructed on the basis of UK firms’ financial constraints proxies to 
monetary policy shocks on BoE’s MPC meetings from June 1999 to December 2011.1 
Following Kuttner (2001), to avoid the potential endogeneity bias discussed in Rigobon and 
Sack (2003, 2004), we use daily data on interest rate shocks and stock returns. We provide 
comprehensive evidence on this issue using an exhaustive and survivorship bias-free dataset 
of firms listed on LSE and utilizing a large number of financial constraints measures that 
have been suggested in prior literature. We also empirically test whether the most constrained 
firms respond to monetary policy shocks in a differential manner relative to the least 
                                                          
1 Bredin et al. (2007), Bredin et al. (2009) and Gregoriou et al. (2009) have also examined the response of stock 
market returns to monetary policy shocks on BoE’s MPC meeting days; however, they examine only aggregate 
market and sectoral returns. 
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constrained ones. In doing so, we shed light on the transmission of UK monetary policy 
decisions through the stock market and we provide evidence on whether investors react to 
these decisions in accordance to the conjectures made on the basis of the credit channel 
mechanism. Moreover, we test for the first time in the UK market, whether the relationship 
between stock returns and interest rate shocks is state dependent by investigating how this 
relationship is modified across different market phases, credit, volatility and liquidity 
conditions. Finally, we also examine whether this relationship was affected by the 
unprecedented global financial crisis of 2007-2009. 
 Previewing our results, we find that there is a large degree of heterogeneity in the 
response of the constrained portfolios’ returns to monetary policy shocks across the various 
proxies we use, indicating that these measures capture different dimensions of this elusive 
concept. Most importantly, with the exception of tangible-to-total assets ratio and KZ-index 
in some cases, for the remaining proxies there is no evidence supporting the argument that the 
most constrained firms’ returns are more responsive to unanticipated interest rate changes on 
MPC meeting days relative to the returns of the least constrained firms. Moreover, we find 
that there has been a reversal in the relationship between UK stock returns and monetary 
policy shocks during the financial crisis of 2007-2009; the well documented inverse 
relationship became significantly positive during the crisis period. Finally, our results reveal 
that this relationship, outside the crisis period, exhibits state dependence. Most significantly, 
returns’ response to interest rate shocks is of much larger magnitude on MPC meetings that 
took place during periods of tight credit conditions. 
 This study is structured as follows. Section 2 provides the details for the calculation of 
monetary policy shocks from interest rate futures prices, the proxies of financial constraints 
and the construction of the corresponding portfolios. Section 3 contains the main body of the 
empirical results on the relationship between monetary policy shocks and portfolios’ returns, 
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also using various model specifications to reveal potential state dependence of the 
relationship. Section 4 presents a series of robustness checks, Section 5 examines the impact 
of alternative economic shocks, while Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Data and Methodology 
2.1. Monetary policy shocks 
Following the methodology of Kuttner (2001), we extract monetary policy shocks on 
BoE’s MPC meeting days relative to interest rates expectations that are embedded in futures 
prices. In this way, we avoid the potential endogeneity bias discussed by Rigobon and Sack 
(2003, 2004) that could derive from using lower frequency (e.g. monthly) data. It should be 
noted that there is no futures market instrument that tracks BoE’s policy rate, the 2-week repo 
rate. Therefore, we follow Bredin et al. (2007), Bredin et al. (2009) and Florackis et al. 
(2014) in utilizing the sterling futures contract that settles on the 3-month British Bankers’ 
Association (BBA) London Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR) prevailing at 11:00 on the last 
trading day (third Wednesday of the delivery month). This contract is traded on the London 
International Financial Futures and Options Exchange (LIFFE) and its settlement price is 100 
minus the BBA LIBOR rounded to three decimal places. The price of this futures contract is 
widely considered to accurately embed market expectations regarding future short-term 
interest rates and, as Brook et al. (2000) note, it is also used by BoE’s MPC for policy 
purposes.2 Data on futures prices are obtained from Thomson Datastream.  
                                                          
2 To be accurate, we actually calculate unexpected short-term LIBOR changes on MPC meeting days and, 
following Bredin et al. (2007), we consider them to be the best proxy for "monetary policy shocks", given the 
absence of a futures contract tracking BoE’s policy rate. Therefore, we use these two terms interchangeably 
though, in principle, they are not necessarily identical. Nevertheless, as Lildholdt and Wetherilt (2004) and 
Joyce et al. (2008) have shown, these LIBOR futures prices reflect market participants’ expectations over future 
interest rates and UK monetary policy quite accurately. 
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The unanticipated (unexpected) interest rate change, u
di , is defined as the change in 
the futures-implied 3-month LIBOR rate on MPC meeting day, d, relative to the previous 
day, d-1: 
, , 1
u
d m d m di f f            
(1) 
where  is the implied interest rate, i.e. 100 minus the LIFFE futures contract price, 
extracted from the corresponding contract with delivery month m nearest to the MPC meeting 
day d.3 On the other hand, the anticipated (expected) interest rate change, e
di , is defined as 
the difference between the actual change in the 3-month LIBOR on MPC meeting day d, di , 
and the corresponding unanticipated change, u
di :
4 
e u
d d di i i         (2) 
In contrast to Bredin et al. (2007), who start their sample period from 1994, we 
consider only meetings that have been publicly announced in advance to ensure that interest 
rate futures prices actually reflected market participants’ expectations regarding monetary 
policy decisions. In particular, the schedule of BoE’s MPC meetings have been publicly 
announced since June 1997.5 Nevertheless, our empirical analysis begins from June 1999, 
since only then 3-month LIBOR futures started settling on a monthly basis. Prior to this date, 
contracts were settling on a quarterly basis and this lack of correspondence between the 
frequency of the contract’s settlement and MPC meetings could potentially lead to a biased 
estimate of the unexpected interest rate change. Avoiding this potential problem, we examine 
                                                          
3 Piazzesi and Swanson (2008) have shown that extracting interest rate shocks using a one-day window is a 
robust approach because any low-frequency premia embedded in futures prices are effectively “differenced 
out”. Actually, some recent studies have employed even shorter time windows, extracting shocks from futures 
prices in the interval of 30-minutes around the announcement of the Fed Funds rate (e.g., Wongswan, 2009). 
Unfortunately, intraday data for interest rate futures and stock prices, which are necessary to calculate 
portfolios’ returns, are not available to us for the UK market. 
4 It should be noted that the 3-month horizons of the LIBOR prevailing on the MPC meeting date and the 
LIBOR that will prevail on the settlement date of the futures contract do not coincide. We would like to thank an 
anonymous referee for this remark. 
5 The list of meetings and decisions is available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetarypolicy. 
,m df
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a total of 152 MPC meetings, from June 1999 to December 2011. Figure 1 illustrates the 
extracted unexpected interest rate changes along with actual LIBOR changes on MPC 
meeting days. 
-Figure 1 here- 
2.2. Financial constraints-sorted portfolios 
The concept of financial constraints is rather elusive because a firm may become 
constrained either due to the size and structure of the assets and liabilities of its balance sheet 
or due to the level and the variability of its cash flows. Since the aim of this study is to 
provide comprehensive evidence regarding the return response of stock portfolios constructed 
on the basis of the degree of financial constraints that firms face, we utilize a number of 
proxies that have been suggested in prior literature. In particular, the following measures are 
used: a firm’s size proxied by the book value of its assets, its ratio of tangible-to-total assets 
as a measure of debt capacity, its total debt-to-common equity and total debt-to-market value 
ratios as measures of leverage, its cash holdings-to-total assets ratio, its interest coverage 
ratio, the composite KZ-index proposed by Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and the composite 
WW-index proposed by Whited and Wu (2006).6 Table 1 presents the list of these measures 
along with their definitions and the corresponding Worldscope (accounting variables) and 
Datastream (market variables) codes used to calculate them.7 Worldscope is the most reliable 
                                                          
6 As the definition of KZ and WW indices presented in Table 1 indicates, these indices combine in a linear 
fashion a firm’s accounting and market characteristics to measure the strength of its financial constraints. To 
calculate firms’ KZ and WW-index values, we use the coefficients suggested in the original studies by Kaplan 
and Zingales (1997) and Whited and Wu (2006), respectively. We acknowledge that one would ideally re-
estimate these structural models for UK firms and utilize the corresponding coefficients to calculate indices’ 
values. However, we do not have a long enough sample to estimate these coefficients and use them to construct 
portfolios. Therefore, we opt for the original US-estimated coefficients and we expect that these should also be 
applicable for UK firms given the similarities in the functioning of these two countries’ financial systems and 
legal frameworks.    
7 It should be noted that when we construct portfolios on the basis of interest coverage ratios, we exclude firms 
with negative values. We also exclude firms with negative debt-to-common equity ratios, arising from negative 
values of common equity. Finally, when we construct portfolios using debt-to-common equity and debt-to-
market value ratios, the firms with zero leverage are assigned to a separate portfolio, because we cannot identify 
whether this capital structure is a strategic decision for unconstrained firms or an inevitable situation for highly 
constrained firms who cannot access external finance. 
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source of accounting information for a sufficiently large cross-section of UK firms and for a 
long time period (see also Soares and Stark, 2009). 
-Table 1 here- 
For the construction of financial constraints-sorted portfolios, we utilize all common 
stocks listed on LSE from 1998 to 2011. Following common practice in the literature, we 
include both listed and de-listed firms, so that our dataset is free of any potential survivorship 
bias. We then exclude unit trusts, investment trusts and ADRs. We impose several screening 
criteria to our initial sample, excluding firms for which the necessary accounting and market 
data are not available for a year. We also exclude firms that have market capitalization less 
than £5 million on a given year. Then, we exclude financial and insurance companies because 
their capital structure and cash flows definition is fundamentally different and by no means 
comparable with the other firms. Having applied these filters, we end up with a total of 2,316 
firms over the examined period.8 To ensure that accounting data were publicly available prior 
to each MPC meeting, and hence they could have been used by an investor in real time to 
measure firms’ financial constraints and construct the corresponding portfolios, we follow 
Soares and Stark (2009) and lag these data by 6 months.9 
For every MPC meeting that takes place in month m, we calculate each of the 
financial constraints measures for each firm using market and accounting data that were 
available to investors at the end of month m-1. In this way, we ensure that we use up-to-date 
information for firms’ degree of financial constraints and that this information was publicly 
available prior to the MPC meeting day. Having calculated these measures, we sort all firms 
that were listed on LSE on MPC meeting day d and assign them to quintile portfolios. The 
                                                          
8 Arguably, financial constraints may be even more severe for unlisted companies, which are predominantly 
small and do not have access to credit (Guariglia, 2008). However, here we examine firms’ return response to 
monetary policy shocks, and hence we can only examine listed companies, whose shares are tradable and 
market prices are observable. 
9 For accounting periods beginning before 2007, firms listed on LSE were allowed by the Financial Services 
Authority (FSA) to publish their financial reports up to 6 months after the end of their fiscal year. For details see 
http://fsahandbook.info/FSA/html/handbook/DTR/4/1. 
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MPC meeting day return of each quintile portfolio p is the value-weighted average of the 
constituent stocks’ returns relative to the previous trading day d-1. Stock prices inclusive of 
dividends (datatype RI) are used for the calculation of returns and they are sourced from 
Datastream. 
-Tables 2 and 3 here- 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for the most constrained (Panel A) and the 
least constrained (Panel B) quintile portfolio returns on these 152 MPC meeting days for each 
of the measures we use as well as the corresponding statistics for FTSE All Share and zero 
leverage portfolios’ returns. Table 3 presents the pairwise correlation coefficients for the 
returns of the most constrained (Panel A) and the least constrained (Panel B) quintile 
portfolios along with FTSE All Share returns on MPC meetings. The pairwise correlations 
among the most constrained quintile portfolio and FTSE All Share returns are quite low, 
confirming that each of these measures captures a different dimension of the financial 
constraints concept. These low correlations also indicate that these portfolios’ return response 
to interest rate changes is expected to be considerably different from the commonly studied 
market return response and to widely vary across the proxies we utilize. The corresponding 
correlations among the least constrained quintile portfolio and market returns are somewhat 
higher, but still low if one takes into account that these are daily returns and that the market 
index mainly consists of big capitalization firms, which are expected to be among the least 
constrained ones. These low correlations indicate again a potentially large degree of 
heterogeneity in these portfolios’ return response to interest rate changes. 
2.3. Proxies for state dependence and other control variables 
 In our attempt to examine whether the relationship between portfolios’ returns and 
interest rate shocks depends on market and other economic conditions, we use a series of 
variables to proxy the state of these conditions. In particular, we firstly use the level of FTSE 
 13 
 
All Share Index on its own as well as relative to its past moving average to determine 
whether there is a bull or a bear market phase. To characterize a recession, we follow the 
technical definition of two consecutive negative real GDP growth rates, using the 2012Q1 
vintage of real GDP data compiled by BoE. As a proxy for credit conditions, we use the 
default yield spread defined as the difference between the long-term corporate redemption 
yield, extracted from the Bank of America-Merill Lynch UK Corporate Bond Index, and the 
10-year UK Government Zero-Coupon Bond yield provided by BoE. As a proxy for financial 
turmoil and stress, we use FTSE 100 Volatility Index, which is extracted from options on 
FTSE 100 and it is the UK market equivalent to VIX that is widely used as a gauge of market 
uncertainty (see Whaley, 2000).10 To measure stock market liquidity, we use the Return-to-
Volume (RtoV) price impact ratio proposed by Amihud (2002). To this end, we calculate for 
a window of 90 trading days the average ratio of FTSE All Share daily returns (in absolute 
value) to the total trading volume of the same day. 
To estimate in a robust way the effect of interest rate shocks on daily portfolio returns, 
we also control for other factors that could affect UK stock returns. More specifically, 
following Bredin et al. (2007), we control for Sterling/ Dollar and Sterling/ Euro daily 
exchange rate changes as well as for the US market return, proxied by the S&P 500 return.11 
Finally, as a measure of adverse funding conditions and stress in the interbank market, we use 
in Section 4.4 the spread between LIBOR and BoE’s policy rate; this spread is equivalent to 
the LIBOR-OIS spread that is commonly used in US studies (see Thornton, 2009 and Nyborg 
and Ostberg, 2010). All of these variables are sourced from Datastream unless otherwise 
stated. Figure 2 illustrates the values of default yield spread, LIBOR-BoE base rate spread 
and FTSE Implied Volatility index on the 152 MPC meeting days we examine in our 
analysis. 
                                                          
10 FTSE 100 Volatility Index is available on a daily basis from January 2000 onwards. 
11 We use lagged S&P 500 daily returns to account for the lag between UK and US stock market closing times. 
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-Figure 2 here- 
 
3. Empirical Results 
3.1. Portfolio returns and monetary policy shocks: The crisis effect 
 The benchmark model specification to examine the relationship between anticipated 
and unanticipated interest rate changes and stock returns, suggested by Bernanke and Kuttner 
(2005), is given by the following regression model: 
   , ,
u u e e
p m d d d dr i i              (3) 
where rp,m,d is the value-weighted return of portfolio p on MPC meeting day d in month m, 
u
di  is the corresponding unanticipated interest rate change and
e
di  is the anticipated interest 
rate change.12 In our attempt to determine the relationship between interest rate shocks and 
stock returns, we also control for other variables that could potentially affect UK stock 
returns in a systematic way. To this end, following Bredin et al. (2007), we also control for 
the Sterling/ Euro and Sterling/ Dollar bilateral exchange rates as well as the lagged S&P 500 
return in the following augmented regression model: 
   , , '
u u e e
p m d d d d dr i i X               (4) 
where the vector Xd contains the additional control variables.
13 
-Table 4 here- 
 We estimate this model for each quintile portfolio constructed by sorting all available 
firms on the basis of each of the eight alternative financial constraints measures that we 
                                                          
12 It should be acknowledged that if the BoE tends to change its policy rate in a persistent manner, any decisions 
regarding the current rate may also contain information about the future expected path of short-term rates, and 
hence affecting longer-term interest rates. In that case, our model specification, which focuses on the stock 
return response to current unexpected interest rate changes may be not be able to capture the corresponding 
response to the future path of interest rates (see Jeenas, 2018, for a related discussion). We would like to thank 
an anonymous referee for this remark. 
13 It should be noted that the relationship between interest rates, FX and stock prices is rather more complex 
than controlling for bilateral exchange rates in a linear fashion (see, for example, Dua and Tuteja, 2016, and Han 
et al., 2018). We would like to thank an anonymous referee for this remark.  
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employ in this study. The benchmark results that we report in this section refer to least 
squares regressions coefficients and Newey-West standard errors with four lags to take into 
account the potential autocorrelation structure. For ease of exposition, in Table 4 and the 
remaining Tables we report the estimated coefficients only for the extreme quintiles, i.e. the 
portfolios containing the most and the least constrained firms, respectively. Results for the 
remaining portfolios are available upon request. As a benchmark for comparison, we also 
report the corresponding estimated coefficients using FTSE All Share Index returns, a proxy 
for UK market returns. We find that, although negative in most of the cases we examine, the 
relationship between anticipated or unanticipated interest rate changes and portfolio returns is 
statistically insignificant. The only exceptions are the most constrained quintile portfolios 
according to the tangible-to-total assets ratio and WW-index, the zero leverage portfolios and 
the least constrained quintile portfolio according to the total debt-to-market value ratio, where 
the inverse relationship between unexpected interest rate changes and returns is significant at 
the 5% level. The reported lack of statistical significance using portfolios sorted on the basis 
of financial constraints proxies complements the findings of Gregoriou et al. (2009) for the 
UK market, showing that this model specification is inadequate to capture the relationship 
between stock returns and monetary policy shocks when the 2007-2009 crisis period is 
included in the sample. 
 The preliminary evidence provided in Gregoriou et al. (2009) for the UK market 
motivates us to examine whether the relationship between the returns of constraints-sorted 
portfolios and interest rate changes reversed its sign during the recent financial crisis. As a 
characteristic example, the unexpected interest rate decrease of 0.4% on the MPC meeting of 
6th November 2008, which is by far the greatest in our sample and took place when BoE cut 
its base rate from 4.5% to 3%, was associated with a dramatic drop in FTSE All Share Index 
of -5.38%, casting doubt on the conventional wisdom that such a massive interest rate cut 
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would instantaneously boost the stock market. Inspecting the returns of the constraints-sorted 
portfolios, we find that the quintile portfolio consisted of firms with the lowest interest 
coverage ratio suffered a loss of -5.61% on that day, while the corresponding portfolio 
containing the firms with lowest cash holdings experienced a return of -7.8%. 
 Similarly, BoE’s policy rate cut from 5% to 4.5% on the MPC meeting of 8th October 
2008 and the corresponding unexpected LIBOR decrease by 0.1% relative to futures-implied 
expectations, was accompanied by another dramatic fall in stock prices. In particular, FTSE 
All Share Index suffered a loss of -4.81% on that day, while the corresponding quintile 
portfolio containing the firms with the lowest interest coverage ratio (cash holdings) 
experienced a fall of -4.37% (-5.3%). A first indication of the potential reversal in the 
relationship’s sign is provided by scatterplots of FTSE All Share returns versus unexpected 
rate changes distinguishing between MPC meetings that took place outside and during the 
crisis period. These two scatterplots are presented in Figure 3, confirming that the negative 
relationship between unexpected rate changes and market returns has turned positive during 
the recent crisis period. 
-Figure 3 here- 
 The negative response of the stock market to interest rate cuts during the crisis period 
also attracted the interest of the financial press.14 A potential explanation of this paradox is 
that unexpected interest rate cuts when the global financial system was collapsing were 
actually perceived as a signal from the central bank that even worse economic conditions lie 
ahead, forcing market participants to dramatically revise downwards their expectations for 
asset prices and sell off risky assets in their attempt to “fly to safety”, mainly by purchasing 
government bonds. To formally examine whether this relationship was modified during the 
                                                          
14 See: “Another paradox of thrift”, The Economist, 18th September 2010. 
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crisis period for the sample of portfolios we have constructed, we utilize the following 
regression model: 
 , , 1 2 1 2(1 ) (1 ) '
u Crisis u u Crisis u e Crisis e e Crisis e
p m d d d d d d dr D i D i D i D i X                    (5) 
where DCrisis takes the value 1 during the period from August 2007 to December 2009.15 The 
choice of the starting period for the financial crisis is motivated by the analysis of 
Brunnermeier (2009) and it coincides with the bank run of Northern Rock which brought the 
UK financial system to a near collapse (see Shin, 2009, for a detailed analysis of this 
episode). 
-Table 5 here- 
 The estimated coefficients for the unexpected rate changes from regression model (5) 
are reported in Table 5. We find that the inverse relationship between monetary policy shocks 
and portfolio returns becomes statistically significant when we exclude the 2007-2009 crisis 
period. Interpreting the reported coefficients, an unexpected interest rate cut of 25 basis 
points on an MPC meeting day would be associated, for example, with a positive FTSE All 
Share return of 2.31% on the same day and returns of 1.65% and 2.15% for the most and the 
least constrained quintile portfolios, respectively, constructed according to interest coverage 
ratio.  
 Examining the responses of the most and the least constrained portfolios’ returns, we 
find that across the various proxies we use, there is no particular pattern to indicate that 
portfolios of the most constrained firms are more responsive to unexpected rate changes. This 
is only true when the tangible-to-total assets ratio and KZ-index are used as constraints 
proxies, while the differential response is statistically significant only in the first case. To the 
contrary, for all of the remaining proxies, this inverse relationship is of higher magnitude for 
                                                          
15 This and the subsequent model specifications involving dummy variables are chosen to allow the presentation 
of the dummy coefficients in a direct rather than an additive way, following the practice of Basistha and Kurov 
(2008). 
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the portfolios containing the least constrained firms.16 The large degree of heterogeneity in 
the estimated return responses among the least as well as among the most constrained 
portfolios also reflects the fact that each of these measures captures a different aspect of 
financial constraints. This feature was also indicated by the low pairwise correlations among 
daily portfolio returns that were reported in Table 3. 
 The evidence provided in Table 5 is at odds with the hypothesis that the most 
constrained firms would be more sensitive to monetary conditions, and hence affected by 
monetary policy shocks to a larger degree relative to the least constrained firms. It also 
partially contradicts the limited prior evidence for the US market by Basistha and Kurov 
(2008) and Jansen and Tsai (2010). There are two potential explanations we put forward for 
this finding. Firstly, investors on LSE may not consider the interaction between financial 
constraints and monetary conditions to be an important source of risk, especially at very short 
horizons, and as a result, it does not affect their decision making even when unexpected 
interest rate changes occur. In other words, according to this line of reasoning, investors do 
not differentiate across UK listed firms on the basis of their financial constraints or they even 
altogether ignore this information when reacting to monetary policy news. 
 Secondly, the most constrained firms are predominantly small capitalization firms, 
especially according to total assets and WW-index proxies that are by definition related to 
firms’ size. The shares of these firms are usually thinly traded, and hence their prices may not 
respond to incorporate interest rate shocks as quickly as it would happen with the more liquid 
stocks of the least constrained and bigger capitalization firms. This argument seems to be 
valid particularly when total assets and WW-index are used as proxies also because the 
explanatory power of the regression model for the daily returns of the most constrained 
                                                          
16 Very similar are the findings when we alternatively classify firms into decile or tercile portfolios on the basis 
of their financial constraints proxies values. Results are readily available upon request. 
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portfolios is extremely low, implying that these returns do not respond either to interest rate 
news or to the other control variables we include in model (5). 
 With respect to the response of returns to unexpected interest rate changes during the 
crisis period, we find that this relationship has indeed reversed its sign and it has become 
positive for the market index as well as the majority of the portfolios constructed on the basis 
of the constraints proxies. Actually, the estimated coefficients are very large and significant 
in some cases, e.g. when cash holdings-to-total assets ratio is used, highlighting the economic 
importance of the direct impact that these unexpected shocks had on stock returns during the 
crisis. Interpreting the reported coefficients, an unexpected interest rate cut of 25 basis points 
on an MPC meeting day during the crisis period would be associated with a negative FTSE 
All Share return of -3.03% on the same day and returns of -5.83% and -3.1% for the quintile 
portfolios containing the firms with the lowest and the highest cash holdings ratios, 
respectively. 
 Formally testing, via a Wald test, whether a shift in the relationship occurred, we can 
significantly reject for almost all of the extreme quintile portfolios the null hypothesis that the 
estimated coefficients of the unexpected interest rate changes are equal outside and during the 
crisis period. Nevertheless, we do not find again any pattern across the various proxies with 
respect to the relative magnitude of the most versus the least constrained portfolios’ return 
sensitivity to unexpected interest rate changes. The most constrained portfolio returns are 
significantly more positively reacting to unexpected rate changes during the crisis period only 
when the total debt-to-market value, cash holdings-to-total assets and interest coverage ratios 
are used as proxies.  
 For Table 5 and the remaining Tables to be legible, we report only the coefficients of 
the unanticipated interest rate changes. However, it should be mentioned that in most of the 
cases, the coefficients of the expected interest rate changes are economically and statistically 
 20 
 
significant, contradicting the evidence provided in Bredin et al. (2007) for an earlier sample 
period. This highly important finding, which was also reported in the seminal study of 
Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) for the US market, is at odds with the conjecture that a fully 
efficient market would have already incorporated expected interest rate changes into stock 
prices. Moreover, it is important to note that for most of the portfolios, the coefficients of the 
Sterling/ Dollar exchange rate change and the lagged S&P 500 return are also significant, 
confirming the importance of adding them to the regression models as control variables, 
while this is not true for the Sterling/ Euro exchange rate change.17 
 Having reduced its base rate to a record low of 0.5% by March 2009, BoE decided to 
engage in a series of rounds of asset purchases financed with its reserves, an operation termed 
as Quantitative Easing (QE), in a further attempt to stabilize the UK economy (see Joyce et 
al., 2010, for an overview, Martin and Milas, 2012, for a critical analysis, and Mallick et al., 
2017, for recent evidence on the effect of QE on stock market volatility). While a detailed 
examination of the impact of QE on stock returns is beyond the aim of this study, we test here 
whether the announcements made with respect to QE policies had any effect on the portfolio 
returns we examine. In particular, we introduce in regression model (5) a dummy variable 
which takes the value of 1 on the MPC meeting days that an increase in asset purchases was 
decided.18 
 Unreported results that are available upon request show that there is no significant 
effect of these QE decisions on the returns of the market index or the constraints-sorted 
portfolios. The explanation we put forward is that the implementation or extension of QE 
policies was fully anticipated by market participants each time, and hence this information 
was already incorporated into stock prices. This is a plausible explanation because even the 
                                                          
17 The estimated coefficients for expected interest rate changes and the control variables are readily available 
upon request. 
18 In particular, these are the MPC meetings on 5th March, 7th May, 6th August and 5th November 2009 as well as 
on 6th October 2011. 
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actual amounts had been communicated and published in the financial press earlier than the 
corresponding MPC meeting, probably because BoE did not intend to take markets by 
surprise with this policy. We have also estimated regression model (5) adding a dummy 
variable that takes the value 1 on 18th September 2001, which is the only unscheduled MPC 
meeting in our sample period. The estimated coefficients are very similar to the ones reported 
in Table 5 and they are available upon request. We have also re-estimated regression model 
(5) excluding the observations after March 2009 since the policy rate was close to the zero 
lower bound since then and the unexpected rate changes were very close to zero. Using this 
shorter time period, the results remain almost identical to the benchmark results presented in 
Table 5. Finally, we have also re-estimated regression model (4) using data only up to August 
2007, i.e. before the beginning of the financial crisis; the derived results confirm the 
conclusions we previously discussed for the impact of monetary policy shocks on constraints-
sorted portfolios’ returns outside the financial crisis period. 
3.2. Portfolio returns and monetary policy shocks: State dependence 
This section examines whether the documented inverse relationship between interest 
rate shocks and portfolio returns outside the crisis period exhibits state dependence, i.e. 
whether its magnitude depends on the market phase, credit, volatility and liquidity conditions. 
We follow the dummy variable approach of Basistha and Kurov (2008) to determine each 
state and estimate the corresponding coefficients of the relationship. We firstly examine 
whether the portfolios’ return response differs across bull and bear markets. Following the 
definition of Jansen and Tsai (2010, p. 985), a bull market is said to occur when the stock 
market index is located between the trough and the peak point, including the peak, and a bear 
market occurs otherwise. We use daily data on FTSE All Share Index to characterize bull and 
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bear market phases.19 The regression model we use to examine whether the relationship is 
modified across these two phases outside the crisis period is given by: 
, , 1 2 3
1 2 3
(1 )(1 ) (1 )
(1 )(1 ) (1 ) '
u Crisis Bull u u Crisis Bull u u Crisis u
p m d d d d
e Crisis Bull e e Crisis Bull e e Crisis e
d d d d d
r D D i D D i D i
D D i D D i D i X
   
    
          
           (6)
 
where DBull takes the value 1 when the market is in a bull phase on MPC meeting day d and 
zero otherwise. This model specification does not differentiate between bull and bear market 
phases during the 2007-2009 crisis period, because this period was characterized by a 
prolonged bear market, and hence such a differentiation would be meaningless. The same 
approach is followed in the subsequent models with dummy variables, since the crisis period 
was predominantly characterized by very high default yield spreads, high volatility and low 
market liquidity (see also Figure 2). Therefore, state dependence is examined only outside the 
crisis period. 
-Table 6 here- 
 The estimated coefficients with respect to unexpected rate changes for the market and 
the constraints-sorted portfolios are presented in Table 6. We also perform a Wald test for the 
null hypothesis that the coefficients of the relationship are equal across bull and bear market 
phases. Overall, the null hypothesis of equality in the coefficients cannot be rejected at the 
5% level, apart from the case of KZ-index, where the returns’ response is significantly 
negative only during bull markets. 
 Setting statistical significance aside, however, we find that the inverse relationship 
between returns and unexpected rate changes in the UK market existed only during bull 
market phases. This is true both for market returns and the returns of portfolios constructed 
on the basis of financial constraints proxies. For example, an unexpected interest rate cut of 
                                                          
19 Obviously, this is an ex post characterization of bull and bear market phases because one needs to know the 
subsequent trough and peak points. For robustness, we use an alternative definition in Section 4.3, where a 
moving average of index values is used and the characterization of bull and bear market phases can be made in 
real time. 
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25 basis points on an MPC meeting day during a bull market phase would be associated with 
a positive FTSE All Share return of 2.16% on the same day, while it would be associated 
with a positive FTSE All Share daily return of only 0.89% during a bear market phase outside 
the crisis period. Actually, our results show that during the bear market of September 2000- 
March 2003, which was the only one in our sample apart from the recent crisis period, there 
was no particular relationship between portfolio returns and unexpected rate changes for most 
of the cases we examine. Moreover, there is no evidence suggesting that interest rate shocks 
had a greater impact on the most constrained portfolios’ returns relative to the least 
constrained ones in either market phase, except when the tangible-to-total assets ratio is used, 
but still the differential magnitude is not statistically significant. 
 To examine whether the relationship between stock returns and interest rate changes 
differs across tight and loose credit conditions outside the crisis period, we estimate the 
following regression model: 
, , 1 2 3
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(1 )(1 ) (1 )
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p m d d d d
e Crisis Credit e e Crisis Credit e e Crisis e
d d d d d
r D D i D D i D i
D D i D D i D i X
   
    
          
         
       
(7)
 
where DCredit takes the value 1 when the default yield spread on MPC meeting day d is higher 
than its sample average value, indicating tight credit conditions, and zero otherwise. The 
estimated coefficients for the returns’ response to unexpected interest rate changes are 
reported in Table 7. We also report the p-value of a Wald test for the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients of the relationship are equal across tight and loose credit market conditions. 
-Table 7 here- 
 Overall, the magnitude of portfolio returns’ response to interest rate shocks was much 
greater during tight credit conditions and, according to the Wald test, this differential is 
significant at the 10% level for half of the cases we have examined. For example, the 
negative response of FTSE All Share returns was almost four times greater on MPC meetings 
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taking place during tight credit conditions (-27.12) relative to the other meetings (-7.55). This 
differential magnitude is even more pronounced for portfolios containing the most 
constrained firms according to KZ-index, tangible-to-total assets, total debt-to-market value 
and cash holdings-to-total assets ratios. Nevertheless, the response of the most constrained 
portfolios’ returns during tight credit conditions is significantly greater relative to the least 
constrained portfolios’ returns only in the first two cases. According to the other proxies, we 
find that either the opposite is true, as in the case of total debt-to-common equity, total debt-
to-market value and interest coverage ratios or that the differential response is not significant. 
Finally, the return response to interest rate shocks during the crisis period is very similar to 
the one reported in the benchmark results of Table 5. 
 The next step is to examine the differential return response according to market 
volatility conditions, as proxied by the FTSE 100 Implied Volatility Index, outside the crisis 
period. The estimated model is given by: 
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           (8)
 
where DVol takes the value 1 when the implied volatility index on MPC meeting day d is 
higher than its sample average value, indicating high market volatility, and zero otherwise. 
The estimated coefficients for interest rate shocks from model (8) are reported in Table 8. 
-Table 8 here- 
 In general, we find that the inverse relationship between returns and shocks outside 
the crisis period is of greater magnitude on MPC meetings that took place during periods of 
high market volatility. However, the standard errors of these coefficients are large, rendering 
them statistically insignificant at the 5% level for most of the portfolios we examined as well 
as for FTSE All Share. Moreover, the differential magnitude of the return response across 
low and high volatility conditions is by no means statistically significant, as the p-values for 
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the corresponding Wald test show. Finally, we do not find any evidence supporting the 
argument that the response of the most constrained portfolios’ returns is significantly greater 
than the response of the least constrained ones, except when the tangible-to-total assets ratio 
is used as a proxy in low market volatility conditions. 
 The last potential state dependence that we examine refers to market liquidity 
conditions, as proxied by the RtoV price impact ratio of FTSE All Share Index, excluding the 
crisis period. In particular, we estimate the following model: 
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where DIlliq takes the value 1 when the 90-day moving average of RtoV calculated on MPC 
meeting day d is higher than its sample average value, indicating that the market is in an 
illiquid state, and zero otherwise. Table 9 reports the estimated coefficients from regression 
model (9). Overall, we find that, outside the crisis period, the inverse relationship between 
interest rate shocks and the returns of constraints-sorted portfolios is relatively more 
pronounced on MPC meetings that took place during illiquid market conditions; this is not 
true, however, for market index returns. Nevertheless, the p-values of the corresponding 
Wald tests indicate that the estimated differential magnitude is by no means statistically 
significant. Moreover, there is no evidence suggesting that the most constrained portfolios’ 
returns are significantly more responsive to unexpected rate changes as compared to the least 
constrained ones either in liquid or in illiquid market conditions; the opposite is actually true 
for most of the constraints proxies we examine. 
-Table 9 here- 
 In summary, we find that the inverse relationship between stock returns and interest 
rate shocks, which was documented outside the crisis period, exhibits state dependence 
indeed. In particular, the negative response of portfolio returns is more pronounced during 
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bull market phases, tight credit conditions, high volatility and market illiquidity, but this 
difference is statistically significant only across credit conditions.20 Furthermore, the results 
reported in Tables 6 to 9 confirm the main finding of our study, i.e. that the return response of 
portfolios containing the most constrained firms is not of greater magnitude relative to the 
response of portfolios containing the least constrained firms, apart from some cases where 
tangible-to-total assets ratio and KZ-index are used as proxies. In other words, investors on 
LSE did not seem to differentiate between the most and the least constrained firms when 
reacting to monetary policy shocks during our sample period and this finding holds true 
across different market phases and credit, volatility and liquidity conditions. 
 
4. Robustness checks 
4.1. Alternative definition of crisis period and robust regression estimates 
 For the benchmark results reported in Table 5, the crisis period was defined to extend 
from August 2007 to December 2009, using the bank run on Northern Rock as a starting 
point. In this section, we examine how robust these results are when a narrower definition of 
the crisis period is used. In particular, the crisis period is now defined to extend from 
September 2008 to August 2009 (see also Florackis et al., 2014 for a similar definition), i.e. 
the period during which the UK economy was officially in recession, using the technical 
definition of two consecutive quarters with negative real GDP growth. Actually, this is the 
only UK recession period from 1992 to 2011. Therefore, this narrower crisis dummy variable 
also serves as a recession dummy variable, enabling us to document at the same time how the 
interest rate shocks- portfolio returns relationship was modified during this recession period, 
in light of the US evidence provided by Basistha and Kurov (2008). 
                                                          
20 It should be noted that, unlike the 2007-2009 crisis period, the bear market phase of September 2000- March 
2003 also included periods of low default yield spreads, low market volatility and low RtoV values. Similarly, 
during the 2010-2011 bull market there were still periods characterized high default yield spreads, high market 
volatility and illiquidity. Therefore, the estimated coefficients considerably differ across the various regression 
models used to examine state dependence. 
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-Table 10 here- 
 We re-estimate model (5), but now the dummy variable DCrisis takes the value 1 during 
the period from September 2008 to August 2009 and zero otherwise. The estimated 
coefficients with respect to the unexpected interest rate changes excluding and during this 
narrower crisis period are reported in Table 10, along with the p-values of a Wald test for the 
null hypothesis that the estimated coefficients are equal across the two periods. These results 
confirm the validity of the benchmark results reported in Table 5. The relationship between 
portfolio returns and interest rate shocks was negative and statistically significant for most of 
the cases examined outside the crisis period, while during the crisis period the sign of this 
relationship became positive and the null hypothesis of equal coefficients across the two 
periods is rejected. Finally, in line with the benchmark results, there is no evidence that the 
most constrained portfolios’ returns were more responsive to unexpected rate changes 
relative the least constrained ones, except when the tangible-to-total assets ratio and KZ-
index are used as proxies.  
 Another potential concern for the documented relationships is the impact of outliers, 
because as Figure 1 shows, large unexpected shocks were extracted on various MPC meeting 
days. To address this issue, we follow Basistha and Kurov (2008) and Kurov (2010), 
employing the robust MM weighted least squares procedure introduced by Yohai (1987). 
This estimation procedure yields robust regression coefficients by minimizing the empirical 
influence of troublesome residuals. Using this procedure, we re-estimate regression model 
(5). Unreported results, which are readily available upon request, confirm the reversal of the 
relationship between returns and interest rate shocks during the crisis period, in accordance to 
the benchmark results reported in Table 5. Actually, using this procedure the coefficients of 
the relationship during the crisis period are now larger and more significant relative to the 
benchmark results. 
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4.2. Interaction terms to examine state dependence 
 Section 3.2 examined whether the interest rate shocks- portfolio returns relationship 
exhibits state dependence using a dummy variable approach. For robustness, in this Section 
we use the state proxy variables as interaction terms and, following Jansen and Tsai (2010), 
we examine how the coefficient of the relationship changes with different values of the state 
proxy. In particular, we interact the anticipated and unanticipated interest rate change with 
each of the credit, volatility and market liquidity state variables alternatively, leading to the 
following general model specification: 
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 (10)
 
where Sd denotes, alternatively, the value of the default yield spread, FTSE 100 implied 
volatility index and RtoV price impact ratio of FTSE All Share on MPC meeting day d. It 
should be noted that for the state variables to be used as interaction terms and to have a 
meaningful interpretation, each of them has been standardized using the average and standard 
deviation of its full sample daily values. 
-Table 11 here- 
 Since our benchmark results showed that credit conditions significantly affect the 
interest rate shocks- portfolio returns relationship, we report in Table 11 the estimated 
coefficients for the unanticipated interest rates changes from regression model (10), using the 
standardized default yield spread as an interaction term. The coefficient of the interaction 
term is estimated to be negative for almost all of the cases we examine, confirming our 
conjecture that the higher the default yield spread is, and hence the tighter the credit 
conditions are, the more negative the relationship between returns and interest rate shocks 
becomes outside the crisis period. However, despite the magnitude of the estimated 
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coefficients, the corresponding standard errors are very large, preventing them from being 
statistically significant at any conventional level. 
 With respect to the remaining state variables, we find that adding implied volatility as 
an interaction term in model (10) does not have any particular economic or statistical 
significance. On the other hand, using our standardized liquidity measure as an interaction 
term, we find that in line with our benchmark results, the magnitude of the inverse 
relationship between interest rate shocks and portfolio returns increases considerably as the 
market becomes more illiquid. However, in most of the cases this effect is too noisy, failing 
to yield statistical significance. These unreported results are available upon request. 
4.3. Alternative proxies for state dependence 
 In this section, we examine the robustness of our benchmark results in Section 3.2 
with respect to the dependence of the shocks- returns relationship on the market phase and 
market liquidity conditions by using a different approach to determine a bull market phase 
and a modified price impact ratio to proxy liquidity. In particular, we re-estimate model (6), 
but now the bull market dummy takes the value 1 if the level of FTSE All Share index is 
higher than its past 500-day moving average and zero otherwise. Moreover, we use the 
Return-to-Turnover Rate (RtoTR) price impact ratio for FTSE All Share, which is a 
modification of the RtoV price impact ratio and it is calculated as the 90-day average ratio of 
absolute FTSE All Shares daily returns to the corresponding turnover rate of the same day. 
Using this alternative proxy, we re-estimate model (9) where now the liquidity dummy takes 
the value 1 when RtoTR on MPC meeting day d is higher than its sample average value, 
indicating an illiquid market state, and zero otherwise. Overall, the results from these 
robustness checks are qualitatively very similar to the benchmark results reported in Tables 6 
and 9, respectively, and they are readily available upon request. 
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4.4. LIBOR-BoE base rate spread changes 
 In this section, we examine how the returns of the financial constraints-sorted 
portfolios respond to an alternative shock on MPC meeting days, namely the change in the 
spread between LIBOR and BoE base rate. This spread is equivalent to the LIBOR-OIS 
spread that is commonly used in US studies (see Thornton, 2009, for an introduction) and it 
serves as a proxy for funding conditions in the interbank market. Increases in LIBOR-BoE 
rate spread indicate an increase in the relative cost of funding for financial intermediaries, 
which eventually leads to an increase in firms’ cost of financing through the bank lending 
transmission mechanism. To examine the response of portfolio returns to changes in this 
spread on MPC meeting days, we estimate the following regression model:   
               , , (  ) '
spread
p m d d d dr LIBOR BoE rate X                 (11)
 
where (  )dLIBOR BoE rate   denotes the (daily) change in this spread on MPC meeting day 
d. This model does not include a dummy variable for the crisis period, exactly because this 
spread was large and exhibited considerable fluctuations mainly during the 2007-2009 crisis 
period, as Figure 2 shows. Therefore, the crisis effect is inherently taken into account by the 
behavior of the spread. The estimated coefficients are reported in Table 12. 
-Table 12 here- 
 We find that for almost all of the portfolios we examined, there is an inverse 
relationship between returns and changes in the LIBOR-BoE rate spread. This negative 
relationship is statistically significant at the 5% level for half of the cases we report. 
Regarding the economic significance of the relationship, we find that an increase of 25 basis 
points in the spread on an MPC meeting day would be associated, for example, with a -0.38% 
drop in FTSE All Share Index as well as a negative return of -0.80% and -0.47% for the most 
constrained quintile portfolios according to cash holdings-to-total assets and interest coverage 
ratios, respectively. These results show that the deterioration of funding conditions for 
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financial intermediaries has a considerable impact on UK stock returns. We also find that this 
negative impact is stronger for the most financially constrained firms relative to the least 
constrained ones only when total debt-to-market value, cash holdings-to-total assets and 
interest coverage ratios are used as proxies, but this differential is significant only for the first 
two cases. Finally, these results also reveal the large degree of heterogeneity in the response 
of portfolio returns to changes in the LIBOR-BoE rate spread across the various constraints 
proxies. 
 
5. The impact of alternative economic shocks 
5.1. Interest rate shocks on non-MPC meeting dates 
 Complementing our benchmark results, this section examines how stock returns 
respond to daily interest rate shocks on days other than the MPC meeting dates. These 
interest rate shocks cannot be interpreted as monetary policy shocks because they may have 
been caused by other macroeconomic news or government policies that may not be 
necessarily related to monetary policy. To this end, we compute the stock returns of financial 
constraints-sorted portfolios as well as the expected and unexpected LIBOR changes, 
computed from LIBOR futures prices, as described in Section 2.1, on every single trading 
day during our sample period. Subsequently, excluding the MPC meeting dates, we regress 
the daily returns of each portfolio p on the corresponding expected and unexpected daily 
interest rate changes using the model specification (4). The corresponding results are reported 
in Table 13.  
-Table 13 here- 
 In sum, we find that daily interest rate shocks on non-MPC meeting days do not have 
a significant contemporaneous impact on stock market returns. This is also true when we 
examine the impact of daily interest rate shocks on stock returns in the cross-section of 
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portfolios constructed on the basis of firms' degree of financial constraints. Most importantly 
for our main hypothesis, for almost all of the proxies used, we find no evidence that daily 
interest rate shocks on non-MPC meeting days have a significantly different impact on the 
returns of the portfolios containing the most constrained firms as compared to the portfolios 
containing the least constrained firms. Finally, it should be mentioned that this evidence 
provides indirect support for the argument that daily stock returns primarily respond to 
monetary policy shocks on MPC meeting days rather than to daily interest rates shocks in 
general. 
5.2. Fed Funds rate shocks on FOMC meeting dates  
 The focus of our benchmark results is on UK monetary policy shocks because these 
are the most relevant ones for firms listed and operating primarily in the UK economy. In this 
section, we alternatively estimate the return response of financial constraints-sorted portfolios 
to US monetary policy shocks. This choice is motivated by the conjecture that US monetary 
policy shocks may affect stock prices internationally (see e.g., Wongswan, 2009) due to the 
dominant position of the US economy and the fact that other monetary authorities may follow 
closely the policies of the Federal Reserve. 
 To this end, we compute the expected and unexpected Fed Funds rate changes on the 
meeting days of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) and the corresponding daily 
returns of the financial constraints-sorted portfolios. To compute the expected and 
unexpected Fed Funds rate changes, we follow the standard approach of Kuttner (2001), 
which has been extensively used in the literature (see e.g., Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005, 
Piazzesi and Swanson, 2008, and Bredin et al., 2007) and utilizes the futures contract written 
on the Fed Funds rate, which is sourced from Thomson Datastream. Moreover, following 
Bredin et al. (2007) and Wongswan (2009), we utilize the daily portfolio returns on the 
trading day following the FOMC meeting, since the London Stock Exchange has already 
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closed before the FOMC meeting. We regress the daily returns of each portfolio p on the 
corresponding expected and unexpected Fed Funds rate changes on FOMC meeting days 
using the model specification (5). The corresponding results are reported in Table 14. 
-Table 14 here- 
 In sum, we find that the UK stock market does not significantly respond to US 
monetary policy shocks during our sample period, even when we account for the potential 
structural break in the relationship during the global crisis period. Similarly, we do not find 
any significant return response to these monetary policy shocks when we examine the cross-
section of financial constraints-sorted portfolios. As a result, for almost all of the proxies 
used, we find no evidence that US monetary policy shocks have a significantly different 
impact on the returns of the portfolios containing the most constrained firms as compared to 
the portfolios containing the least constrained firms. 
5.3. Shocks from a macro-VAR model 
In this subsection, we examine the impact of macroeconomic shocks on the stock 
returns of financial constraints-sorted portfolios. In particular, we examine the impact of 
industrial production growth, inflation rate and interest rate shocks on stock portfolio returns 
at the monthly frequency. To this end, we compute monthly returns for the financial 
constraints-sorted quintile portfolios. To estimate the impact of these shocks, we utilize a 
simple macro-VAR system for the UK, similar to the one employed by Kontonikas and 
Kostakis (2013) for the US.21 
The endogenous variables vector is '[ , , , ]t t t t jtipn inf libor ry  where ipnt is the growth 
rate of industrial production, inft is the inflation rate computed as the growth rate of consumer 
                                                          
21 The rationale behind the use of a simple macro-VAR framework is to provide results that are directly 
comparable to previous UK evidence. We acknowledge that an obvious extension of our work is to identify the 
monetary policy shocks using modern estimation techniques such as the Bayesian Structural Vector Auto-
Regression and the Sign-Restrictions VAR. For example, Mallick and Sousa (2013) use these techniques to 
examine the real effects of financial stress in the Eurozone.  
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price index (cpi), libort is the UK 1-month interbank rate and rjt is the monthly return on 
stock portfolio j. The macroeconomic variables have been sourced from Thomson 
Datastream. Based on the Akaike Information Criterion, the lag order of the estimated VAR 
is two and a constant is also included. Since it is well-known that the resulting impulse 
response functions depend upon the ordering of the variables in the VAR (see e.g. Lutkepohl, 
2005), our results utilize the Generalized Impulse Response function of Pesaran and Shin 
(1998), which is invariant to the ordering of the variables in the VAR. 
 Table 15 presents the contemporaneous generalized impulse return response of the 
quintile portfolios with the most and the least financially constrained firms, as well as the 
corresponding response of their spread return, to a one-standard deviation shock to monthly 
interest rate. Results are reported for the quintile portfolios constructed on the basis of the 
Kaplan-Zingales (KZ) and Whited-Wu (WW) indices of financial constraints. Results for the 
other proxies are available upon request. 
-Table 15 here- 
Figures 4-6 present the multi-period generalized impulse return responses of the quintile 
portfolios containing the most and the least financially constrained firms to one-standard 
deviation shocks to monthly interest rate, industrial production growth and inflation rate, 
respectively. Again, results are reported for the quintile portfolios constructed on the basis of 
the Kaplan-Zingales (KZ) and Whited-Wu (WW) indices of financial constraints. Results for 
the other proxies are available upon request. 
-Figures 4-6 here- 
 The main results from this macro-VAR analysis can be synopsized as follows. First, 
there is no evidence that, even at the monthly frequency, interest rate shocks have a 
significantly different contemporaneous impact on the stock returns of the quintile portfolio 
containing the most constrained firms relative to the quintile portfolio containing the least 
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constrained firms. If anything, it is the portfolio with the least constrained firms that exhibits 
the most negative contemporaneous return response to an adverse interest rate shock. Second, 
only the contemporaneous return response to an interest rate shock is significant; the impact 
of this shock on portfolio returns dies out quickly and remains insignificant beyond the first 
month. Third, a positive shock to industrial production growth causes a positive portfolio 
return response that seems to persist in the subsequent month too, but again there is no 
significantly different impact between the portfolios containing the most and the least 
constrained firms. Finally, these portfolio returns do not significantly respond to an inflation 
rate shock. 
 In sum, the evidence from the macro-VAR model estimated at the monthly frequency 
supports the main conclusions of our benchmark results. Financial constraints-sorted 
portfolio returns do respond to interest rate shocks, but this response is not significantly 
different between the portfolios of the most and the least constrained firms. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 This study examines, for the first time in the literature, the return response of the most 
and the least constrained firms listed on LSE, as classified according to a series of financial 
constraints proxies, to monetary policy shocks during the period June 1999- December 2011. 
Following Bredin et al. (2007) and Bredin et al. (2009), these shocks are extracted on BoE 
MPC meeting days, relative to expectations embedded in LIBOR futures prices. Using a large 
number of constraints proxies to provide comprehensive evidence, we derive a series of 
interesting conclusions. 
 Firstly, we find no significant evidence that the return response of the most 
constrained firms is of greater magnitude relative to corresponding response of the least 
constrained firms, apart from some cases where the tangible-to-total assets ratio and KZ-
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index are used as proxies. The opposite is actually true for most of the measures we use. This 
evidence is at odds with the implication of the credit channel of the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism and the limited existing evidence for the US market (see Ehrmann 
and Fratzscher, 2004, Basistha and Kurov, 2008 and Jansen and Tsai, 2010). The primary 
explanation we put forward for this finding is that investors on LSE do not regard the 
interaction between financial constraints and monetary conditions to be an important source 
of risk, especially at very short horizons, and hence they do not differentiate across listed 
firms on the basis of their constraints when reacting to monetary policy shocks. 
 Secondly, these results also highlight the large degree of heterogeneity in the return 
response across the proxies we use, revealing that they capture different aspects of the elusive 
concept of financial constraints. Therefore, relying only on a subset of these measures to 
derive strong conclusions regarding the effect of financial constraints on the interest rate 
shocks- stock returns relationship would be rather misleading. Thirdly, our results show that 
the inverse relationship between monetary policy shocks and stock returns that is documented 
outside the 2007-2009 crisis period became positive during the crisis. This is true both for the 
market index and for the majority of the portfolios containing the most and the least 
constrained firms listed on LSE. This finding remains intact when we use the UK recession 
period of September 2008- August 2009 to define an alternative, narrower crisis period. 
 Finally, the reported results reveal that the relationship between stock returns and 
monetary policy shocks in the UK market exhibits state dependence. In particular, we find 
that excluding the crisis period, this inverse relationship is of greater magnitude during bull 
market phases, tight credit conditions, high market volatility and illiquidity periods. 
However, this differential magnitude is statistically significant only in the case of tight credit 
conditions.  
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 Our results have direct implications for regulators, investors and corporate financial 
decision-makers. With respect to regulators and central bankers, we show that the Bank of 
England can affect stock market valuations via monetary policy shocks and we examine 
whether this effect may differ across firms with different degrees of financial constraints. 
Moreover, we show that this impact is not stable across time. These findings are also very 
important for investors who construct portfolios of stocks with different capital structure and 
cash flow characteristics because this differential exposure to monetary policy shocks could 
affect the degree of portfolio diversification and it could inform their risk assessment 
practices and risk management strategies. Finally, the documented exposure to monetary 
policy risk has implications for the cost of capital that companies with different degrees of 
financial constraints face. As a result, this finding could inform the practices of financial 
decision-makers in their attempt to determine the cost of capital of their corporations, a 
variable that plays a central role in every aspect of corporate financial management. 
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Table 1 
Definitions of financial constraints proxies 
This Table contains the definitions of eight financial constraints proxies used to classify all of the non-financial firms 
listed on LSE into quintile portfolios as well as the Datastream and Worldscope data items used to calculate them. 
 
Financial constraints measure Definition Data Items used 
1. Total Assets Book Value of Total Assetst  
Worldscope item: 
WC02999 
2. Tangible-to-Total Assets ratio 
Tangible Assets
Total Assets
t
t
 
Worldscope item: 
WC02501 
3. Total Debt-to-Common Equity 
ratio 
Total Debt
Book Value of Common Equity
t
t
 
Worldscope item: 
WC08231 
4. Total Debt-to-Market Value ratio 
Total Debt
Market Value
t
t
 
Worldscope item: 
WC03255 and MV 
5. Cash holdings-to-Total Assets 
ratio 
Cash Holdings
Total Assets
t
t
 
Worldscope item: 
WC02001 and 
WC02999 
6. Interest Coverage ratio 
EBIT
Total Interest Expense ratio
t
t
 
Worldscope item: 
WC08291 
7. Kaplan-Zingales (KZ) index 
 
1
1
1
Cash Flow
KZ 1.002
Prop, Plant and Equip
0.283 Tobin's Q
Total Debt
+3.139
Total Capital
Dividends Paid
39.368
Prop, Plant and Equip
Cash Holdings
1.315
Prop, Plant and Equip
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t



  
 

 
 
 
Worldscope item: 
WC01250, 
WC01151, 
WC02501, 
WC02999, 
WC03501, 
WC03451, MV, 
WC03255, 
WC03998, WC04551 
and WC02001 
8. Whited-Wu (WW) index 
Cash Flow
WW 0.091
Total Assets
0.062 Dividend dummy
Long-term Debt
0.021
Total Assets
0.044 ln(Total Assets )
0.102 Industry Sales Growth
0.035 Firm Sales Growth
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Worldscope item: 
WC01250, 
WC01151, 
WC02999, 
WC04551, 
WC03251, 
WC01001 and 
FTAG3 for industry 
classification 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics 
Panel A reports the descriptive statistics for the value-weighted daily returns of quintile portfolios with the most 
constrained firms on BoE MPC meeting days during the period June 1999- December 2011 (152 meetings). 
Panel B reports the corresponding descriptive statistics for the value-weighted daily returns of the quintile 
portfolios with the least constrained firms, zero leverage firms and FTSE All Share Index. All of the non-
financial firms listed on LSE have been classified into quintile portfolios prior to the MPC meeting day using 
each of the eight financial constraints proxies defined in Table 1. Panel C contains the corresponding descriptive 
statistics for expected and unexpected interest rate changes and the values of default yield spread, LIBOR-BoE 
base rate spread, FTSE 100 Implied Volatility Index and Return-to-Volume (RtoV) price impact ratio for FTSE 
All Share Index on MPC meetings. 
 
Panel A: Most constrained quintile portfolios 
Financial constraints proxy Mean Median Max Min St. Dev. 
1. Total Assets 0.03% 0.02% 9.51% -6.27% 1.16% 
2. Tangible-to-Total Assets ratio 0.06% -0.02% 7.20% -5.39% 1.64% 
3. Total Debt-to-Common Equity ratio -0.17% 0.01% 3.69% -5.30% 1.19% 
4. Total Debt-to-Market Value ratio -0.08% 0.05% 4.88% -5.88% 1.37% 
5. Cash holdings-to-Total Assets ratio 0.10% 0.05% 6.91% -7.80% 1.82% 
6. Interest Coverage ratio -0.26% -0.04% 4.87% -5.61% 1.39% 
7. Kaplan-Zingales (KZ) index -0.12% -0.03% 6.74% -5.69% 1.68% 
8. Whited-Wu (WW) index 0.03% 0.01% 10.92% -5.37% 1.37% 
Panel B: Least constrained quintile portfolios, zero leverage portfolios and FTSE All Share 
Financial constraints proxy Mean Median Max Min St. Dev. 
1. Total Assets -0.10% -0.09% 4.47% -5.61% 1.27% 
2. Tangible-to-Total Assets ratio -0.11% -0.09% 4.45% -6.77% 1.46% 
3. Total Debt-to-Common Equity ratio 0.09% 0.07% 7.45% -6.88% 1.66% 
4. Total Debt-to-Market Value ratio -0.06% -0.04% 9.19% -5.37% 1.64% 
5. Cash holdings-to-Total Assets ratio 0.04% -0.02% 7.93% -6.64% 1.88% 
6. Interest Coverage ratio -0.12% -0.08% 5.77% -6.58% 1.57% 
7. Kaplan-Zingales (KZ) index -0.21% -0.15% 4.52% -4.47% 1.28% 
8. Whited-Wu (WW) index -0.10% -0.09% 4.46% -5.61% 1.27% 
Zero Debt-to-Common Equity ratio -0.07% 0.01% 9.15% -5.53% 1.82% 
Zero Debt-to-Market Value ratio -0.06% 0.01% 9.15% -5.53% 1.81% 
FTSE All Share -0.12% -0.10% 5.15% -5.38% 1.31% 
Panel C: Interest rate changes and variables for state dependence 
 Mean Median Max Min St. Dev. 
Unexpected rate changes -0.005% 0% 0.26% -0.40% 0.07% 
Expected rate changes -0.001% 0% 0.23% -0.39% 0.07% 
Default yield spread 1.72% 1.40% 6.11% 0.83% 1.02% 
LIBOR-BoE base rate 0.26% 0.17% 2.40% -0.50% 0.39% 
FTSE 100 Implied Volatility 21.61 19.41 56.81 9.50 9.19 
RtoV Price impact ratio 1.84 1.76 4.98 0.49 1.02 
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Table 3 
Correlation coefficients 
Panel A reports the pairwise correlation coefficients between the value-weighted daily returns of quintile portfolios of the most constrained firms as well as of FTSE All 
Share Index on BoE MPC meeting days during the period June 1999- December 2011 (152 meetings). Panel B contains the corresponding correlation coefficients between 
the value-weighted daily returns of quintile portfolios of the least constrained firms as well as of FTSE All Share Index. All of the non-financial firms listed on LSE have 
been classified into quintile portfolios prior to the MPC meeting day using each of the eight financial constraints proxies defined in Table 1. 
 
Panel A: Correlation coefficients for the most constrained quintile portfolios and FTSE All Share 
Financial constraints proxy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 FTSE 
1. Total Assets 1         
2. Tangible-to-Total Assets ratio 0.67 1        
3. Total Debt-to-Common Equity ratio 0.34 0.60 1       
4. Total Debt-to-Market Value ratio 0.43 0.63 0.81 1      
5. Cash holdings-to-Total Assets ratio 0.46 0.70 0.72 0.72 1     
6. Interest Coverage ratio 0.42 0.60 0.83 0.84 0.61 1    
7. Kaplan-Zingales (KZ) index 0.47 0.70 0.80 0.77 0.66 0.78 1   
8. Whited-Wu (WW) index 0.89 0.70 0.42 0.48 0.51 0.47 0.54 1  
FTSE All Share 0.44 0.76 0.86 0.83 0.83 0.80 0.83 0.50 1 
Panel B: Correlation coefficients for the least constrained quintile portfolios and FTSE All Share 
Financial constraints proxy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 FTSE 
1. Total Assets 1         
2. Tangible-to-Total Assets ratio 0.92 1        
3. Total Debt-to-Common Equity ratio 0.78 0.69 1       
4. Total Debt-to-Market Value ratio 0.74 0.60 0.81 1      
5. Cash holdings-to-Total Assets ratio 0.82 0.72 0.83 0.91 1     
6. Interest Coverage ratio 0.85 0.77 0.76 0.73 0.79 1    
7. Kaplan-Zingales (KZ) index 0.82 0.66 0.71 0.76 0.76 0.80 1   
8. Whited-Wu (WW) index 1.00 0.92 0.78 0.75 0.83 0.86 0.83 1  
FTSE All Share 0.97 0.89 0.77 0.75 0.82 0.82 0.81 0.97 1 
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Table 4 
Returns response to interest rate changes without accounting for crisis effect 
This table presents the estimated coefficients from least squares regressions of daily value-weighted returns of 
quintile portfolios with the most and the least constrained firms on expected and unexpected interest rate changes 
on BoE MPC meeting days during the period June 1999- December 2011, according to model (4): 
, , '
u u e e
p m d d d d dr i i X           . Firms listed on LSE have been classified into quintile portfolios 
prior to the MPC meeting day using each of the eight financial constraints proxies defined in Table 1. The 
corresponding estimates for the spread return between the most and the least constrained portfolios, zero leverage 
portfolio returns and FTSE All Share returns are also reported. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively, for the estimated coefficients using Newey-West standard errors. 
 
Financial constraints proxy Portfolio 
u  e  R2 adj. 
1. Total Assets 
Most constrained -2.42 -0.35 1.17% 
Least constrained -1.98 -2.24 18.05% 
Most-Least spread -0.44 1.89 8.59% 
2. Tangible-to-Total Assets 
Most constrained -9.09** -5.38 7.13% 
Least constrained 0.75 -1.26 18.06% 
Most-Least spread -9.83*** -4.12 9.90% 
3. Total Debt-to- Common 
Equity 
Most constrained -2.05 -1.17 18.87% 
Least constrained -4.88 -3.35 11.85% 
Zero Leverage -8.71** -6.07 14.59% 
Most-Least spread 2.83 2.19 -2.22% 
4. Total Debt-to-Market 
Value 
Most constrained 0.57 2.23 16.44% 
Least constrained -6.40** -4.81** 12.51% 
Zero Leverage -8.88** -6.16 15.03% 
Most-Least spread 6.97** 7.04 4.36% 
5. Cash holdings-to-Total 
Assets 
Most constrained -0.03 0.36 7.09% 
Least constrained -6.92 -4.11 18.16% 
Most-Least spread 6.89** 4.47* 2.95% 
6. Interest Coverage ratio 
Most constrained -0.21 0.61 18.73% 
Least constrained -2.87 -2.22 16.41% 
Most-Least spread 2.65 2.83 -1.58% 
7. Kaplan-Zingales index 
Most constrained -5.72 -3.41 12.59% 
Least constrained -4.24 -2.57 13.59% 
Most-Least spread -1.48 -0.84 -0.25% 
8. Whited-Wu index 
Most constrained -4.20** -1.70 2.13% 
Least constrained -1.93 -2.16 17.73% 
Most-Least spread -2.27 0.46 4.53% 
 
FTSE All Share -2.33 -2.14 16.19% 
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Table 5 
Returns response to unexpected interest rate changes accounting for crisis effect 
This table presents the estimated coefficients from least squares regressions of daily value-weighted returns of 
quintile portfolios with the most and the least constrained firms on expected and unexpected interest rate changes on 
BoE MPC meeting days during the period June 1999- December 2011, according to model (5): 
, , 1 2 1 2(1 ) (1 ) '
u Crisis u u Crisis u e Crisis e e Crisis e
p m d d d d d d dr D i D i D i D i X                   , where 
DCrisis takes the value 1 on MPC meetings from August 2007 to December 2009. p-values for the Wald test of the 
null hypothesis that the coefficients of unexpected rate changes outside and during the crisis period are equal,
1 2
u u  , are presented in square brackets. The corresponding estimates for the spread return between the most 
and the least constrained portfolios, zero leverage portfolio returns and FTSE All Share returns are also reported. 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively, for the estimated coefficients 
using Newey-West standard errors. 
 
 
Financial constraints proxy Portfolio 1
u  2
u  1 2
u u   R2 adj. 
1. Total Assets 
Most constrained -3.17 -1.48 [0.67] 0.14% 
Least constrained -8.52*** 11.35*** [0.00] 24.20% 
Most-Least spread 5.35* -12.83***  13.19% 
2. Tangible-to-Total Assets 
Most constrained -14.72*** 3.82 [0.00] 9.82% 
Least constrained -6.67** 15.75*** [0.00] 23.94% 
Most-Least spread -8.05** -11.93***  10.12% 
3. Total Debt-to- Common 
Equity 
Most constrained -7.22** 8.36** [0.00] 22.88% 
Least constrained -14.41*** 14.84*** [0.00] 19.67% 
Zero Leverage -14.45*** 4.68 [0.00] 17.00% 
Most-Least spread 7.20** -6.48  -0.43% 
4. Total Debt-to-Market 
Value 
Most constrained -6.31** 14.97*** [0.00] 22.90% 
Least constrained -10.06*** -0.88 [0.11] 14.36% 
Zero Leverage -14.63*** 4.54 [0.00] 17.48% 
Most-Least spread 3.75 15.86***  8.27% 
5. Cash holdings-to-Total 
Assets 
Most constrained -11.12*** 23.31*** [0.00] 16.17% 
Least constrained -16.18*** 12.39*** [0.00] 23.70% 
Most-Least spread 5.07 10.92***  2.13% 
6. Interest Coverage ratio 
Most constrained -6.59** 12.73*** [0.00] 23.38% 
Least constrained -8.59** 7.22 [0.00] 19.71% 
Most-Least spread 2.00 5.51*  -1.61% 
7. Kaplan-Zingales index 
Most constrained -10.28** 3.83 [0.01] 13.43% 
Least constrained -7.59** 2.82 [0.02] 14.30% 
Most-Least spread -2.69 1.01  -1.24% 
8. Whited-Wu index 
Most constrained -4.71 -3.88* [0.86] 1.05% 
Least constrained -8.53*** 11.43*** [0.00] 23.93% 
Most-Least spread 3.81 -15.31***  9.53% 
 
FTSE All Share -9.25*** 12.13*** [0.00] 22.78% 
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Table 6 
Returns response to unexpected interest rate changes in bull and bear markets 
This table presents the estimated coefficients from least squares regressions of daily value-weighted returns of 
quintile portfolios with the most and the least constrained firms on expected and unexpected interest rate changes on 
BoE MPC meeting days during the period June 1999- December 2011, according to model (6): 
, , 1 2 3(1 )(1 ) (1 ) ...
u Crisis Bull u u Crisis Bull u u Crisis u
p m d d d d dr D D i D D i D i                 where DCrisis 
takes the value 1 on MPC meetings from August 2007 to December 2009 and DBull takes the value 1 when FTSE All 
Share Index is in a bull phase and zero otherwise, using the bull market definition of Jansen and Tsai (2010). p-
values for the Wald test of the null hypothesis that the coefficients of unexpected rate changes in bear and bull 
markets are equal, 1 2
u u  , are presented in square brackets. The corresponding estimates for the spread return 
between the most and the least constrained portfolios, zero leverage portfolio returns and FTSE All Share returns are 
also reported. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively, for the estimated 
coefficients using Newey-West standard errors. 
 
Financial constraints 
proxy 
Portfolio 1
u  2
u  3
u  1 2
u u   R2 adj. 
1. Total Assets 
Most constrained 1.37 -3.95 -1.47 [0.19] -0.18% 
Least constrained -1.87 -8.56** 11.28*** [0.22] 26.43% 
Most-Least spread 3.23 4.61 -12.75***  12.77% 
2. Tangible-to-Total 
Assets 
Most constrained -12.46* -12.51*** 3.61 [0.99] 10.14% 
Least constrained 1.76 -8.26** 15.79*** [0.09] 25.12% 
Most-Least spread -14.22 -4.25 -12.18***  9.82% 
3. Total Debt-to- 
Common Equity 
Most constrained -0.59 -7.78** 8.33** [0.23] 24.70% 
Least constrained -13.05* -11.64** 14.59*** [0.86] 20.20% 
Zero Leverage -12.46*** -13.47** 4.58 [0.89] 16.30% 
Most-Least spread 12.47 3.86 -6.26  -0.98% 
4. Total Debt-to-Market 
Value 
Most constrained -2.51 -6.17** 14.92*** [0.59] 22.94% 
Least constrained -0.99 -11.09** -0.90 [0.08] 16.29% 
Zero Leverage -12.43*** -13.79** 4.45 [0.85] 16.78% 
Most-Least spread -1.52 4.92* 15.82***  8.11% 
5. Cash holdings-to-Total 
Assets 
Most constrained -0.13 -11.33*** 23.21*** [0.10] 19.17% 
Least constrained -15.21** -13.17** 12.13*** [0.80] 23.96% 
Most-Least spread 15.08* 1.84 11.08***  3.21% 
6. Interest Coverage ratio 
Most constrained 1.62 -8.06** 12.76*** [0.22] 24.75% 
Least constrained 1.69 -9.75* 7.21 [0.06] 22.27% 
Most-Least spread -0.07 1.69 5.56*  -2.55% 
7. Kaplan-Zingales index 
Most constrained 7.04 -14.80*** 4.01 [0.00] 18.07% 
Least constrained 3.84 -10.19** 2.91 [0.00] 17.89% 
Most-Least spread 3.21 -4.61 1.10  -1.05% 
8. Whited-Wu index 
Most constrained 1.93 -6.64 -3.79* [0.14] 0.85% 
Least constrained -1.95 -8.39** 11.35*** [0.23] 26.31% 
Most-Least spread 3.87 1.76 -15.14***  9.22% 
 
FTSE All Share -3.54 -8.63** 12.02*** [0.35] 24.82% 
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Table 7 
Returns response to unexpected interest rate changes in tight and loose credit conditions 
This table presents the estimated coefficients from least squares regressions of daily value-weighted returns of quintile 
portfolios with the most and the least constrained firms on expected and unexpected interest rate changes on BoE 
MPC meeting days during the period June 1999- December 2011, according to model (7): 
, , 1 2 3(1 )(1 ) (1 ) ...
u Crisis Credit u u Crisis Credit u u Crisis u
p m d d d d dr D D i D D i D i                , where DCrisis 
takes the value 1 on MPC meetings from August 2007 to December 2009 and DCredit takes the value 1 when the 
default yield spread is higher than its full sample average daily value and zero otherwise. p-values for the Wald test of 
the null hypothesis that the coefficients of unexpected rate changes in loose and tight credit market conditions are 
equal, 1 2
u u  , are presented in square brackets. The corresponding estimates for the spread return between the 
most and the least constrained portfolios, zero leverage portfolio returns and FTSE All Share returns are also reported. 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively, for the estimated coefficients 
using Newey-West standard errors. 
 
Financial constraints 
proxy 
Portfolio 1
u  2
u  3
u  1 2
u u   R2 adj. 
1. Total Assets 
Most constrained -1.49 -22.99 -1.51 [0.26] 1.27% 
Least constrained -7.11** -24.24** 11.33*** [0.12] 24.69% 
Most-Least spread 5.62* 1.25 -12.85***  12.03% 
2. Tangible-to-Total 
Assets 
Most constrained -10.71*** -69.68*** 3.67 [0.00] 15.93% 
Least constrained -6.47** -9.64 15.74*** [0.82] 22.89% 
Most-Least spread -4.24 -60.03*** -12.07***  17.85% 
3. Total Debt-to- 
Common Equity 
Most constrained -6.53** -12.50 8.37** [0.50] 22.41% 
Least constrained -10.16*** -75.16*** 14.66*** [0.00] 27.00% 
Zero Leverage -12.00*** -54.13* 4.54 [0.14] 18.74% 
Most-Least spread 3.63 62.65*** -6.29  9.30% 
4. Total Debt-to-Market 
Value 
Most constrained -4.50 -25.74** 14.96*** [0.04] 24.25% 
Least constrained -7.54** -43.46*** -0.96 [0.02] 16.58% 
Zero Leverage -12.28*** -53.70*** 4.39 [0.14] 19.17% 
Most-Least spread 3.03 17.72** 15.92***  7.88% 
5. Cash holdings-to-
Total Assets 
Most constrained -8.49** -41.18** 23.28*** [0.07] 17.56% 
Least constrained -14.26*** -42.35* 12.32*** [0.23] 23.91% 
Most-Least spread 5.77 1.17 10.96***  1.44% 
6. Interest Coverage 
ratio 
Most constrained -6.33** -2.29 12.80*** [0.78] 23.22% 
Least constrained -5.53 -46.41*** 7.15 [0.00] 23.12% 
Most-Least spread -0.79 44.12*** 5.64**  3.66% 
7. Kaplan-Zingales 
index 
Most constrained -7.14** -48.63** 3.76 [0.06] 16.41% 
Least constrained -5.49* -29.06** 2.81 [0.11] 16.73% 
Most-Least spread -1.65 -19.57** 0.95  -0.94% 
8. Whited-Wu index 
Most constrained -2.80 -26.30 -3.90* [0.27] 2.07% 
Least constrained -7.03** -25.08** 11.42*** [0.11] 24.59% 
Most-Least spread 4.23 -1.22 -15.32***  8.39% 
 
FTSE All Share -7.55*** -27.12** 12.12*** [0.10] 23.92% 
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Table 8 
Returns response to unexpected interest rate changes in high and low volatility conditions 
This table presents the estimated coefficients from least squares regressions of daily value-weighted returns of 
quintile portfolios with the most and the least constrained firms on expected and unexpected interest rate changes 
on BoE MPC meeting days during the period June 1999- December 2011, according to model (8): 
, , 1 2 3(1 )(1 ) (1 ) ...
u Crisis Vol u u Crisis Vol u u Crisis u
p m d d d d dr D D i D D i D i                , where DCrisis 
takes the value 1 on MPC meetings from August 2007 to December 2009 and DVol takes the value 1 when the FTSE 
100 Implied Volatility Index is higher than its full sample average daily value and zero otherwise. p-values for the 
Wald test of the null hypothesis that the coefficients of unexpected rate changes in low and high market volatility 
conditions are equal, 1 2
u u  , are presented in square brackets. The corresponding estimates for the spread return 
between the most and the least constrained portfolios, zero leverage portfolio returns and FTSE All Share returns 
are also reported. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively, for the 
estimated coefficients using Newey-West standard errors. 
 
Financial constraints 
proxy 
Portfolio 1
u  2
u  3
u  1 2
u u   R2 adj. 
1. Total Assets 
Most constrained -4.05*** -5.88 -1.76 [0.87] -0.91% 
Least constrained -6.35* -12.63 11.36*** [0.48] 23.67% 
Most-Least spread 2.30 6.75 -13.12***  12.38% 
2. Tangible-to-Total 
Assets 
Most constrained -11.99*** -25.02* 3.58 [0.38] 9.78% 
Least constrained -5.86 -5.94 15.94*** [0.99] 23.76% 
Most-Least spread -6.14** -19.08 -12.35***  11.28% 
3. Total Debt-to- 
Common Equity 
Most constrained -3.86 -11.35 8.68** [0.33] 22.44% 
Least constrained -10.35*** -28.39** 14.62*** [0.12] 20.78% 
Zero Leverage -10.33** -23.64* 4.63 [0.23] 16.76% 
Most-Least spread 6.48* 17.04** -5.94  0.69% 
4. Total Debt-to-Market 
Value 
Most constrained -3.88 -14.48* 14.93*** [0.20] 23.72% 
Least constrained -6.39* -16.45 -0.62 [0.37] 13.66% 
Zero Leverage -10.74** -23.40* 4.50 [0.40] 17.10% 
Most-Least spread 2.52 1.97 15.55***  8.97% 
5. Cash holdings-to-
Total Assets 
Most constrained -5.70 -16.57 23.78*** [0.37] 15.35% 
Least constrained -10.49** -31.68** 12.03*** [0.10] 25.04% 
Most-Least spread 4.79 15.11** 11.76***  4.18% 
6. Interest Coverage 
ratio 
Most constrained -3.13 -13.55 12.69*** [0.27] 22.70% 
Least constrained -6.59 -15.27 6.94 [0.42] 20.15% 
Most-Least spread 3.46 1.72 5.75*  0.10% 
7. Kaplan-Zingales 
index 
Most constrained -9.70*** -10.81 4.18 [0.95] 11.87% 
Least constrained -5.46 -12.48 2.80 [0.52] 13.60% 
Most-Least spread -4.23 1.67 1.38  -1.32% 
8. Whited-Wu index 
Most constrained -4.75** -11.10 -4.14** [0.66] 1.24% 
Least constrained -6.32* -13.05 11.40*** [0.46] 23.52% 
Most-Least spread 1.56 1.95 -15.54***  9.23% 
 
FTSE All Share -8.01** -13.21 12.14*** [0.60] 22.41% 
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Table 9 
Returns response to unexpected interest rate changes in liquid and illiquid market conditions 
This table presents the estimated coefficients from least squares regressions of daily value-weighted returns of quintile 
portfolios with the most and the least constrained firms on expected and unexpected interest rate changes on BoE MPC 
meeting days during the period June 1999- December 2011, according to model (9): 
, , 1 2 3(1 )(1 ) (1 ) ...
u Crisis Illiq u u Crisis Illiq u u Crisis u
p m d d d d dr D D i D D i D i                , where DCrisis takes 
the value 1 on MPC meetings from August 2007 to December 2009 and DIlliq takes the value 1 when the 90-day 
moving average of RtoV price impact ratio for FTSE All Share is higher than its full sample average daily value and 
zero otherwise. p-values for the Wald test of the null hypothesis that the coefficients of unexpected rate changes in 
liquid and illiquid market conditions are equal, 1 2
u u  , are presented in square brackets. The corresponding 
estimates for the spread return between the most and the least constrained portfolios, zero leverage portfolio returns and 
FTSE All Share returns are also reported. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively, for the estimated coefficients using Newey-West standard errors. 
 
Financial constraints 
proxy 
Portfolio 1
u  2
u  3
u  1 2
u u   R2 adj. 
1. Total Assets 
Most constrained -2.87 -3.99 -1.64 [0.89] -0.70% 
Least constrained -7.91** -9.46** 11.41*** [0.78] 23.21% 
Most-Least spread 5.04 5.47 -13.05***  12.78% 
2. Tangible-to-Total 
Assets 
Most constrained -13.36** -16.65** 4.02 [0.73] 9.04% 
Least constrained -6.58 -6.75 15.79*** [0.98] 22.89% 
Most-Least spread -6.78 -9.91 -11.77***  9.31% 
3. Total Debt-to- 
Common Equity 
Most constrained -4.90 -10.99*** 8.46** [0.22] 22.46% 
Least constrained -12.56** -17.61** 14.82*** [0.61] 18.73% 
Zero Leverage -9.60** -23.27*** 4.41 [0.12] 17.76% 
Most-Least spread 7.66 6.62 -6.36  -1.62% 
4. Total Debt-to-Market 
Value 
Most constrained -5.43 -7.35* 15.21*** [0.70] 22.78% 
Least constrained -7.11 -15.43** -1.06 [0.25] 14.25% 
Zero Leverage -9.86** -23.34*** 4.26 [0.12] 18.25% 
Most-Least spread 1.69 8.08* 16.27***  11.04% 
5. Cash holdings-to-
Total Assets 
Most constrained -8.70* -15.26** 23.31*** [0.39] 15.25% 
Least constrained -10.41** -26.17*** 12.34*** [0.13] 24.08% 
Most-Least spread 1.71 10.91 10.97***  1.71% 
6. Interest Coverage 
ratio 
Most constrained -4.02 -10.32*** 13.08*** [0.24] 24.38% 
Least constrained -8.45* -9.14* 7.05 [0.92] 18.93% 
Most-Least spread 4.44 -1.18 6.03**  1.85% 
7. Kaplan-Zingales 
index 
Most constrained -7.44 -14.81** 4.00 [0.33] 12.84% 
Least constrained -5.70 -10.75** 2.86 [0.40] 13.41% 
Most-Least spread -1.75 -4.06 1.15  -2.09% 
8. Whited-Wu index 
Most constrained -2.97 -8.30 -4.19** [0.61] 1.54% 
Least constrained -7.88** -9.53** 11.48*** [0.76] 22.93% 
Most-Least spread 4.92 1.23 -15.67***  10.74% 
 
FTSE All Share -9.45** -8.67** 12.24*** [0.89] 21.92% 
 51 
 
Table 10 
Returns response to unexpected interest rate changes using an alternative crisis period 
This table presents the estimated coefficients from least squares regressions of daily value-weighted returns of 
quintile portfolios with the most and the least constrained firms on expected and unexpected interest rate changes on 
BoE MPC meeting days during the period June 1999- December 2011, according to model (5): 
, , 1 2 1 2(1 ) (1 ) '
u Crisis u u Crisis u e Crisis e e Crisis e
p m d d d d d d dr D i D i D i D i X                   , where 
DCrisis takes now the value 1 on MPC meetings from September 2008 to August 2009. p-values for the Wald test of 
the null hypothesis that the coefficients of unexpected rate changes outside and during the crisis period are equal,
1 2
u u  , are presented in square brackets. The corresponding estimates for the spread return between the most 
and the least constrained portfolios, zero leverage portfolio returns and FTSE All Share returns are also reported. 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively, for the estimated coefficients 
using Newey-West standard errors. 
 
 
Financial constraints proxy Portfolio 1
u  2
u  1 2
u u   R2 adj. 
1. Total Assets 
Most constrained -2.76 -2.29 [0.91] 0.04% 
Least constrained -7.20** 10.49*** [0.00] 22.55% 
Most-Least spread 4.45 -12.78***  12.18% 
2. Tangible-to-Total Assets 
Most constrained -13.43*** 2.07 [0.01] 8.20% 
Least constrained -5.49 15.39*** [0.00] 23.02% 
Most-Least spread -7.94** -13.31***  9.67% 
3. Total Debt-to- Common 
Equity 
Most constrained -5.83** 6.95** [0.00] 21.09% 
Least constrained -13.79*** 17.45*** [0.00] 20.11% 
Zero Leverage -13.09*** 3.85 [0.00] 15.91% 
Most-Least spread 7.96** -10.50***  1.69% 
4. Total Debt-to-Market 
Value 
Most constrained -5.00 14.99*** [0.00] 21.39% 
Least constrained -8.99** -3.02 [0.22] 14.72% 
Zero Leverage -13.29*** 3.73 [0.00] 16.39% 
Most-Least spread 4.00 18.01***  10.58% 
5. Cash holdings-to-Total 
Assets 
Most constrained -9.90** 24.96*** [0.00] 15.59% 
Least constrained -15.48*** 14.46*** [0.00] 23.82% 
Most-Least spread 5.57 10.50***  1.94% 
6. Interest Coverage ratio 
Most constrained -5.06 11.78*** [0.00] 21.62% 
Least constrained -7.36* 5.45 [0.02] 19.79% 
Most-Least spread 2.30 6.33**  -0.01% 
7. Kaplan-Zingales index 
Most constrained -9.02** 2.77 [0.02] 12.68% 
Least constrained -6.40* 0.98 [0.07] 13.33% 
Most-Least spread -2.62 1.78  -1.08% 
8. Whited-Wu index 
Most constrained -4.43 -4.16* [0.95] 0.87% 
Least constrained -7.20** 10.56*** [0.00] 22.30% 
Most-Least spread 2.76 -14.72***  8.18% 
 
FTSE All Share -7.88** 11.38*** [0.00] 20.96% 
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Table 11 
Returns response to unexpected interest rate changes with default spread as interaction term 
This table presents the estimated coefficients from least squares regressions of daily value-weighted returns of 
quintile portfolios with the most and the least constrained firms on expected and unexpected interest rate changes on 
BoE MPC meeting days during the period June 1999- December 2011, according to model (10): 
, , 1 2 3(1 ) (1 ) ...
u Crisis u u Crisis u u Crisis u
p m d d d d d dr D i D S i D i                where DCrisis takes the value 
1 on MPC meetings from August 2007 to December 2009 and Sd is the value of the default yield spread on MPC 
meeting day d, standardized with respect to its full sample daily values. The corresponding estimates for the spread 
return between the most and the least constrained portfolios, zero leverage portfolio returns and FTSE All Share 
returns are also reported. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively, for 
the estimated coefficients using Newey-West standard errors. 
 
 
 
Financial constraints 
proxy 
Portfolio 1
u  2
u  3
u  R2 adj. 
1. Total Assets 
Most constrained -4.84 -3.56 -1.49 -1.12% 
Least constrained -15.82** -14.96 11.24*** 24.19% 
Most-Least spread 10.97 11.40 -12.73*** 12.55% 
2. Tangible-to-Total 
Assets 
Most constrained -27.11** -25.21 3.61 10.27% 
Least constrained -8.74 -3.80 15.67*** 23.20% 
Most-Least spread -18.37 -21.40 -12.05*** 10.87% 
3. Total Debt-to- 
Common Equity 
Most constrained -13.38** -12.82 8.29** 22.86% 
Least constrained -31.09** -33.75* 14.54*** 21.58% 
Zero Leverage -32.50*** -36.27* 4.33 18.94% 
Most-Least spread 17.71 20.93 -6.24 0.51% 
4. Total Debt-to-Market 
Value 
Most constrained -12.76* -13.33 14.89*** 22.66% 
Least constrained -20.90** -22.05 -1.07 14.73% 
Zero Leverage -32.09*** -34.99* 4.19 19.30% 
Most-Least spread 8.14 8.72 15.96*** 7.46% 
5. Cash holdings-to-
Total Assets 
Most constrained -23.26** -24.92 23.14*** 16.42% 
Least constrained -27.57** -23.08 12.19*** 23.73% 
Most-Least spread 4.32 -1.84 10.95*** 0.95% 
6. Interest Coverage 
ratio 
Most constrained -6.19 0.52 12.77*** 22.47% 
Least constrained -16.94* -17.33 7.13 19.66% 
Most-Least spread 10.75 17.85 5.65** -1.60% 
7. Kaplan-Zingales 
index 
Most constrained -21.49* -22.80 3.64 13.55% 
Least constrained -12.30 -9.92 2.78 13.81% 
Most-Least spread -9.20 -12.88 0.86 -1.03% 
8. Whited-Wu index 
Most constrained -8.07 -7.10 -3.90* 0.01% 
Least constrained -16.03** -15.41 11.32*** 23.98% 
Most-Least spread 7.96 8.31 -15.23*** 8.60% 
 
FTSE All Share -16.27** -14.53 12.04*** 22.73% 
 53 
 
Table 12 
Returns response to changes in the LIBOR-BoE base rate spread 
This table presents the estimated coefficients from least squares regressions of daily value-weighted returns of 
quintile portfolios with the most and the least constrained firms on changes in the LIBOR- BoE base rate spread on 
MPC meeting days during the period June 1999- December 2011, according to model (11): 
, , (  ) '
spread
p m d d d dr LIBOR B E rate X          . The corresponding estimates for the spread return 
between the most and the least constrained portfolios, zero leverage portfolio returns and FTSE All Share returns are 
also reported. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively, for the estimated 
coefficients using Newey-West standard errors. 
 
Financial constraints proxy Portfolio 
spread  R2 adj. 
1. Total Assets 
Most constrained -0.19 0.65% 
Least constrained -1.51*** 22.45% 
Most-Least spread 1.32** 11.03% 
2. Tangible-to-Total Assets 
Most constrained -0.63 4.17% 
Least constrained -1.91*** 22.99% 
Most-Least spread 1.28** 4.58% 
3. Total Debt-to- Common 
Equity 
Most constrained -1.35*** 22.87% 
Least constrained -1.77** 14.82% 
Zero Leverage -0.43 12.58% 
Most-Least spread 0.42 -1.77% 
4. Total Debt-to-Market 
Value 
Most constrained -1.89*** 22.38% 
Least constrained 0.27 11.06% 
Zero Leverage -0.42 12.90% 
Most-Least spread -2.17*** 9.73% 
5. Cash holdings-to-Total 
Assets 
Most constrained -3.21*** 19.24% 
Least constrained -1.35* 20.64% 
Most-Least spread -1.86*** 8.45% 
6. Interest Coverage ratio 
Most constrained -1.42*** 22.30% 
Least constrained -0.87 17.52% 
Most-Least spread -0.55 -1.02% 
7. Kaplan-Zingales index 
Most constrained -0.52 11.95% 
Least constrained -0.82** 13.98% 
Most-Least spread 0.29 0.40% 
8. Whited-Wu index 
Most constrained -0.14 22.16% 
Least constrained -1.52*** 1.17% 
Most-Least spread 1.37** 6.89% 
 
FTSE All Share -1.52*** 20.41% 
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Table 13 
Returns response to interest rate changes on all trading days excluding MPC meeting days  
This table presents the estimated coefficients from least squares regressions of daily value-weighted returns of 
quintile portfolios with the most and the least constrained firms on expected and unexpected interest rate changes on 
all trading days over the period June 1999 –December 2011 excluding the BoE MPC meeting days, according to 
model (4): , , '
u u e e
p m d d d d dr i i X           . The corresponding estimates for the spread return 
between the most and the least constrained portfolios, zero leverage portfolio returns and FTSE All Share returns are 
also reported. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively, for the estimated 
coefficients using Newey-West standard errors. 
 
Financial constraints proxy Portfolio 
u  e  R2 adj. 
1. Total Assets 
Most constrained -0.11 -0.36 11.16% 
Least constrained 1.08 -0.96 8.41% 
Most-Least spread -1.19 0.60 0.88% 
2. Tangible-to-Total Assets 
Most constrained 0.68 -1.80** 11.00% 
Least constrained 1.71 -0.39 9.11% 
Most-Least spread -1.03 -1.42** 2.29% 
3. Total Debt-to- Common 
Equity 
Most constrained 0.48 -1.16* 6.27% 
Least constrained 0.54 -1.46 10.64% 
Most-Least spread -0.06 0.30 4.33% 
4. Total Debt-to-Market 
Value 
Most constrained 0.54 -1.15 7.84% 
Least constrained 0.69 -1.56 9.60% 
Most-Least spread -0.15 0.41 0.66% 
5. Cash holdings-to-Total 
Assets 
Most constrained -0.07 -1.37 7.30% 
Least constrained -0.07 -1.96** 11.02% 
Most-Least spread 0.14 0.59 0.07% 
6. Interest Coverage ratio 
Most constrained 1.20 -1.02* 7.54% 
Least constrained 1.80 -0.95 9.92% 
Most-Least spread -0.59 -0.07 2.30% 
7. Kaplan-Zingales index 
Most constrained 0.44 -1.45 8.86% 
Least constrained 0.05 -1.85*** 8.04% 
Most-Least spread 0.38 0.40 1.95% 
8. Whited-Wu index 
Most constrained -0.16 -0.75* 12.28% 
Least constrained 1.09 -0.95 8.49% 
Most-Least spread -1.25 0.20 0.91% 
 
FTSE All Share 1.18 -1.02 9.76% 
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Table 14 
Returns response to US monetary policy shocks 
This table presents the estimated coefficients from least squares regressions of daily value-weighted returns of 
quintile portfolios with the most and the least constrained firms on expected and unexpected Fed Funds rate changes 
on Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting days during the period June 1999- December 2011, according 
to model (5): 
 , , 1 2 1 2(1 ) (1 ) '
u Crisis u u Crisis u e Crisis e e Crisis e
p m d d d d d d dr D i D i D i D i X                   , where 
DCrisis takes the value 1 on FOMC meeting days from August 2007 to December 2009. p-values for the Wald test of 
the null hypothesis that the coefficients of unexpected rate changes outside and during the crisis period are equal,
1 2
u u  , are presented in square brackets. The corresponding estimates for the spread return between the most 
and the least constrained portfolios, zero leverage portfolio returns and FTSE All Share returns are also reported. 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively, for the estimated coefficients 
using Newey-West standard errors.  
 
 
 
Financial constraints proxy Portfolio 1
u  2
u  1 2
u u   R2 adj. 
1. Total Assets 
Most constrained -1.13 -1.63 [0.16] 11.17% 
Least constrained -1.27 -0.54 [0.72] 0.07% 
Most-Least spread 0.13 -1.09  4.46% 
2. Tangible-to-Total Assets 
Most constrained -2.18 -1.02 [0.51] 1.51% 
Least constrained -1.19 -1.17 [0.66] 3.52% 
Most-Least spread -0.99 0.15  7.22% 
3. Total Debt-to- Common 
Equity 
Most constrained -1.58 0.75 [0.47] 3.76% 
Least constrained -2.27 -1.27 [0.54] -0.26% 
Most-Least spread 0.68 0.53  7.03% 
4. Total Debt-to-Market 
Value 
Most constrained -4.37*** -1.82 [0.02] 10.24% 
Least constrained 0.95 -0.002 [0.91] 1.70% 
Most-Least spread -5.32*** -1.82***  7.59% 
5. Cash holdings-to-Total 
Assets 
Most constrained -2.15 -1.03 [0.57] 0.56% 
Least constrained -4.59 -2.47 [0.06] 9.59% 
Most-Least spread 2.44 1.44***  5.97% 
6. Interest Coverage ratio 
Most constrained -2.35 -0.54 [0.34] 4.30% 
Least constrained 1.93 0.001 [0.64] 0.99% 
Most-Least spread -4.29* -0.54  15.35% 
7. Kaplan-Zingales index 
Most constrained -1.29 -1.26 [0.65] 6.50% 
Least constrained -1.54 0.15 [0.69] -1.22% 
Most-Least spread 0.25 -1.41  9.82% 
8. Whited-Wu index 
Most constrained -1.69 -0.90 [0.35] 2.56% 
Least constrained -1.25 -0.48 [0.73] -0.07% 
Most-Least spread -0.44 -0.42  2.28% 
 
FTSE All Share -2.13 -0.64 [0.42] 1.72% 
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Table 15 
Impulse responses of portfolio returns to one-standard deviation 
shock to the monthly interest rate 
 
This table shows the generalized impulse responses of stock portfolios’ returns to a one-standard deviation 
shock to the monthly interest rate. Results are reported for quintiles portfolios containing the most and the 
least constrained firms, as classified according to the Kaplan-Zingales and the Whited-Wu indices of 
financial constraints. The endogenous vector is 𝑦𝑡 = [𝑖𝑝𝑛𝑡, 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑡 , 𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑡, 𝑟𝑗𝑡], where 𝑖𝑝𝑛𝑡 is the growth rate 
of industrial production, 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑡 is the growth rate of the consumer price index (cpi),  𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑡 is the UK 1-
month interbank rate, and 𝑟𝑗𝑡 is the return of stock portfolio j. The lag order of the estimated VAR is two 
and a constant is also included. The frequency of the variables is monthly and the sample period extends 
from January 1991 to December 2011. Standard errors for the impulse responses are shown in parentheses. 
** stands for statistical significance at 5% level, while *** stands for statistical significance at 1% level. 
 Portfolio 
Financial constraints proxy Most Constrained Least Constrained Most-Least spread 
1. Kaplan-Zingales index -0.0035 -0.0057** 0.0025 
 (0.0035) (0.0027) (0.0027) 
 
2. Whited-Wu index -0.0042 -0.0073*** 0.0056 
 (0.0044) (0.0025) (0.0041) 
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Figure 1 
Changes in LIBOR and unexpected interest rate changes 
 
 
 
Notes: This Figure presents the daily changes in 3-month LIBOR as well as the corresponding unexpected interest rate changes, relative to expectations 
embedded in 3-month LIBOR futures prices, on BoE MPC meeting days during the period June 1999- December 2011 (152 meetings). 
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Figure 2 
Default yield spread, LIBOR-BoE base rate spread and FTSE 100 Implied Volatility Index 
 
 
Notes: This Figure presents the values of the default yield spread and LIBOR-BoE base rate spread (left axis) as well as the values of the FTSE 100 
Implied Volatility Index on BoE MPC meeting days during the period June 1999- December 2011 (152 meetings). 
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Figure 3 
Unexpected interest rate changes and FTSE All Share returns 
 
 
 
Notes: This Figure presents the combinations of daily unexpected interest rate changes, relative to expectations embedded in 3-month LIBOR futures prices, and 
daily FTSE All Share Index returns on BoE MPC meetings. Panel A presents these combinations for MPC meetings that took place during the periods June 1999- 
July 2007 and January 2010- December 2011, i.e. excluding the crisis period. Panel B presents the corresponding combinations for MPC meetings that took place 
during the crisis period, i.e. August 2007- December 2009. In both panels, a linear fit extracted from a univariate regression of FTSE All Share returns on unexpected 
interest rate changes is also drawn. 
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Figure 4 
Generalized impulse responses of portfolio returns to one-standard deviation  
shock to the monthly interest rate 
 
This figure shows the generalized impulse responses (solid curves) of the most constrained (Panels A and C) 
and least constrained (Panel B and D) portfolios’ value-weighted excess returns to a one-standard deviation 
shock to the monthly interest rate. Firms are classified into quintile portfolios according to the Kaplan-Zingales 
and the Whited-Wu indices of financial constraints. The dashed curves are 95% confidence intervals calculated 
from standard errors. The endogenous vector is 𝑦𝑡 = [𝑖𝑝𝑛𝑡 , 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑡 , 𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑡, 𝑟𝑗𝑡], where 𝑖𝑝𝑛𝑡 is the growth rate of 
industrial production, 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑡 is the growth rate of the consumer price index (cpi),  𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑡 is the UK 1-month 
interbank rate, and 𝑟𝑗𝑡 is the return of stock portfolio j. The lag order of the estimated VAR is two and a 
constant is also included. The frequency of the variables is monthly and the sample period extends from 
January 1991 to December 2011. 
 
 
Panel A: Most Constrained Firms                                     Panel B: Least Constrained Firms 
                               (Kaplan-Zingales index)                                                       (Kaplan-Zingales index)   
 
      
 
 
 
Panel C: Most Constrained Firms                                     Panel D: Least Constrained Firms 
                               (Whited-Wu index)                                                                  (Whited-Wu index)   
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Figure 5 
Generalized impulse responses of portfolio returns to one-standard deviation  
shock to the industrial production growth 
 
This figure shows the generalized impulse responses (solid curves) of the most constrained (Panels A and C) 
and least constrained (Panel B and D) portfolios’ value-weighted excess returns to a one-standard deviation 
shock to the industrial production growth. Firms are classified into quintile portfolios according to the Kaplan-
Zingales and the Whited-Wu indices of financial constraints. The dashed curves are 95% confidence intervals 
calculated from standard errors. The endogenous vector is 𝑦𝑡 = [𝑖𝑝𝑛𝑡, 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑡 , 𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑡, 𝑟𝑗𝑡], where 𝑖𝑝𝑛𝑡 is the 
growth rate of industrial production, 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑡 is the growth rate of the consumer price index (cpi),  𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑡 is the UK 
1-month interbank rate, and 𝑟𝑗𝑡 is the return of stock portfolio j. The lag order of the estimated VAR is two and 
a constant is also included. The frequency of the variables is monthly and the sample period extends from 
January 1991 to December 2011. 
 
 
Panel A: Most Constrained Firms                                     Panel B: Least Constrained Firms 
                                (Kaplan-Zingales index)                                                       (Kaplan-Zingales index) 
 
      
 
 
 
Panel C: Most Constrained Firms                                     Panel D: Least Constrained Firms 
                               (Whited-Wu index)                                                                  (Whited-Wu index)   
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Figure 6 
Generalized impulse responses of portfolio returns to one-standard deviation  
shock to the inflation rate 
 
This figure shows the generalized impulse responses (solid curves) of the most constrained (Panels A and C) 
and least constrained (Panel B and D) portfolios’ value-weighted excess returns to a one-standard deviation 
shock to the inflation rate. Firms are classified into quintile portfolios according to the Kaplan-Zingales and 
the Whited-Wu indices of financial constraints. The dashed curves are 95% confidence intervals calculated 
from standard errors. The endogenous vector is 𝑦𝑡 = [𝑖𝑝𝑛𝑡 , 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑡 , 𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑡, 𝑟𝑗𝑡], where 𝑖𝑝𝑛𝑡 is the growth rate of 
industrial production, 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑡 is the growth rate of the consumer price index (cpi),  𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑡 is the UK 1-month 
interbank rate, and 𝑟𝑗𝑡 is the return of stock portfolio j. The lag order of the estimated VAR is two and a 
constant is also included. The frequency of the variables in our dataset is monthly and the sample period 
extends from January 1991 to December 2011. 
 
 
Panel A: Most Constrained Firms                                     Panel B: Least Constrained Firms 
                                (Kaplan-Zingales index)                                                        (Kaplan-Zingales index) 
                                     
             
 
 
 
Panel C: Most Constrained Firms                                     Panel D: Least Constrained Firms 
                               (Whited-Wu index)                                                                  (Whited-Wu index)   
 
      
 
